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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellants Sharon Craig Anderson and Colleen Craig Erickson ("Appellants") appeal
a final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in
favor of Appellee Robert D. Irvine ("Appellee Irvine"). The Utah Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2), this matter having been
transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that a deed executed in 1981 created
both an exclusive life estate and a joint tenancy interest in real property in the grantor under
the deed. The standard of review for this issue, as a conclusion of law, is that the trial court's
findings be accorded no particular deference by the appellate court, but that they be reviewed
for correctness.Truiillo v. Jenkins. 840 P.2d 777,778-79 (Utah 1992); Wadev. StangL 869
P.2d9, 12 (Utah App. 1994).
Issue 2. Whether the trial court, having found that a 1981 deed created both an
exclusive life estate and a joint tenancy interest in the grantor of the real property, erred in
denying cotenants an accounting for profits and expenses of the Property from the other
cotenants. The standard of review for this issue, as a conclusion of law, is that the trial
court's findings be accorded no particular deference by the appellate court, but that they be
reviewed for correctness. Truiillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992); Wade v.
StangL 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1994).
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Issue 3. Whether the trial court erred in appointing Appellee Irvine as receiver of the
Property. The standard of review for this issue, as a conclusion of law, is that the trial court's
findings be accorded no particular deference by the appellate court, but that they be reviewed
for correctness. Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutory provisions are determinative or of central importance to this
appeal:
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-3: "A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a
conveyance of real estate, unless it appears from the conveyance that a lesser estate
was intended."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Appellants appeal a final Judgment of the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. This action arises under common
law and statutory interpretation.
Appellants will show (1) that Appellee Irvine is not entitled to a one-third interest as
tenant in common in certain real property (the "Property"); (2) that, if Appellee Irvine is
entitled to an interest in the Property, he must account to his cotenants for profits and
expenses of the Property received or incurred by him; and (3) that Appellee Irvine may not
be appointed receiver of the Property.
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Appellants are entitled to have their title to the Property quieted from any claim of
Appellee Irvine and are entitled to an accounting from Appellee Irvine for all profits and
expenses of the Property received or incurred by him. Therefore, this Court should find that
the trial court erred in awarding Appellee Irvine an interest in the Property, in denying
Appellants an accounting from Appellee Irvine and in appointing Appellee Irvine receiver
of the Property,
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Appellee Irvine brought suit against Appellants requesting (i) that the trial court
partition the Property among the parties according to their respective rights; (ii) that the trial
court order the sale of the Property and the division of the proceeds among the parties
according to their respective rights; (iii) that the trial court enjoin Appellants [Defendants]
from management of the Property; and (iv) that the trial court appoint a receiver for the
Property in accordance with Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 66(b).
Appellants answered the allegations of the Complaint denying the same and brought
their counterclaim alleging: (1) that Appellee Irvine's ownership, if any, in the Property was
extinguished upon the death of Ada Craig; (2) that Appellants are entitled to an accounting
from Appellee Irvine during such periods for which he exercised control over the Property;
and (3) that Appellants are entitled to judgment against Appellee Irvine for profits from and
damages to the Property during such period for which he exercised control over the Property.
Appellee Irvine answered the allegations of the Appellants' Counterclaim denying the
same.
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The matter was tried before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson on September 28-29,
2004. The trial court rendered its decision orally in court on October 14, 2004. The
Judgment of the trial court was entered on December 6, 2004. The trial court awarded
Appellee Irvine a one-third interest as tenant in common in the Property with the remaining
two-thirds held by Appellants; appointed Appellee Irvine receiver of the Property to sell the
Property and divide the proceeds equally amount the owners; and awarded Appellee Irvine
his costs.
Appellants filed their Motion for Reconsideration on November 10,2004. A Minute
Entry denying that motion was entered on December 9, 2004.
Appellants filed their Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment on December
20, 2004. A Minute Entry denying the Motion was entered on January 13, 2005.
Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on February 22,2005. Appellants appeal the
trial court's decision and ask this Court to reverse the trial court.
Statement of Facts
At the beginning of 1981, Ada Craig was the sole owner of real property located at
251 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Property").
On or about January 19, 1981, Ada Craig conveyed the Property to Appellants by
quitclaim deed, subject to a retained life estate (the "1981 Deed"). Plaintiffs Exhibit 1.
The 1981 Deed states as follows: "Ada R. Craig ... hereby quit claims to Ada R.
Craig, Sharon V. Craig [Sharon Craig Anderson] and Colleen R. Craig [Colleen Craig
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Erickson] as Joint Tenants with foil rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common,
reserving a Life Estate only for Ada R. Craig...." Plaintiffs Exhibit 1.
On February 6, 1996, Ada Craig executed her last will and testament (the "1996
Will"). See Defendants'Exhibit 19.
In the 1996 Will, Ada Craig devised and bequeathed her estate in equal shares to
Appellants, and specifically omitted any provision for her other children. The last paragraph
of Article Fifth of the 1996 Will states: "I have intentionally and with foil knowledge
omitted any provision for Robert Douglas Irvine [Appellee Irvine], Raymond Walker Irvine,
Carolyn Kay Irvine Abbott [Carolyn Abbott], and Mark Albert Craig."
On or about January 21, 1999, Ada Craig conveyed all of her interest in the Property
to Carolyn Abbott by quitclaim deed (the "1999 Abbott Deed").
From approximately June 1999 until July 2003 Appellee Irvine assumed and
maintained sole management and control of the Property.
On or about May 20, 2002, Carolyn Abbott conveyed her interest in the Property to
Appellee Irvine by Warranty Deed (the "2002 Irvine Deed").
Ada Craig died on July 11, 2003.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The trial court erred in finding that the 1981 Deed created both an exclusive life
estate and a joint tenancy interest in Ada Craig. An exclusive life estate is a present estate
in real property while a joint tenancy is the concurrent ownership of a present estate in real
property. These two estates are incompatible and cannot exist in the same property at one and
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the same time. Ada Craig's intent in the 1981 Deed was to convey the Property to the
Appellants upon her death. Therefore, this Court should find that upon Ada Craig's death,
the Property vested exclusively in the Appellants.
2. The trial court erred in denying Appellants an accounting for profits and expenses
of the Property from their cotenants. Each cotenant is a fiduciary with regard to the
remaining cotenants. Appellants are entitled as a matter of right to an accounting from
Appellee Irvine who asserted that he was a cotenant. Therefore, this Court should find that
Appellants are entitled to an accounting for their cotenancy.
3. The trial court erred in appointing Appellee Irvine receiver of the Property. Rule
66(b), addresses the appointment of a receiver. Rule 66(b) states that no party to an action
shall be appointed receiver without the written consent of all parties to the action. Appellants
did not consent, in writing or otherwise, to the appointment of Appellee Irvine as receiver.
Therefore, this Court should find that Appellee Irvine may not be appointed receiver with
respect to the Property.
ARGUMENTS
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 1981 DEED CREATED
BOTH AN EXCLUSIVE LIFE ESTATE AND A JOINT TENANCY INTEREST IN THE
GRANTOR.
Appellants asked the trial court for an interpretation of the 1981 Deed finding that
Appellants are the sole owners of the Property. The trial court instead found that the 1981
Deed created both an exclusive life estate in Ada Craig and a joint tenancy among Ada Craig,
Sharon and Colleen.
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The Appellants argue and ask this Court to find that a grant of both an exclusive life
estate and a joint tenancy interest by the 1981 Deed are inconsistent and incompatible
interests. Appellants ask this Court to reconsider the 1981 Deed in this light. Construction
of the 1981 Deed consistent with the trial court's ruling and findings regarding Ada Craig's
intent will result infindingthat Ada Craig retained a life estate, with a remainder interest in
Appellants.
Estates in Real Property
Estates in real property may be considered in two classes: present estates and future
estates. The 1981 Deed purports to create two separate present estates:first,to convey the
Property to Ada Craig, Sharon and Colleen as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, and
second, to reserve an exclusive life estate only for Ada Craig. For the reasons put forth by
Appellants at trial, and reiterated here, the two actions which the 1981 Deed purports to
accomplish are fundamentally incompatible and cannot coexist in real property.
Concurrent estates are a division of real property ownership separate and distinct from
the division into present and future estates. A concurrent interest is a present interest and
exists whenever two or more persons have a concurrent and equal right to the possession and
use of the same parcel of land. At common law there were five types of concurrent estates,
three of which survive for all practical purposes today and one of which concerns us in this
matter: the joint tenancy.
"Joint tenants have one and the same interest, accruing by one and the same
conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the same undivided
possession. A joint tenancy is concurrent ownership of an estate in fee simple, fee-tail, for
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life, for years, or at will, arising by grant to two or more persons." Black's Law Dictionary
5th Edition, page 1313. The estates referred to in this definition are all present estates and not
future estates. A joint tenancy is concurrent ownership of ^present [emphasis added] estate
arising on the date of grant. A joint tenancy cannot be concurrent ownership of a future
estate because the unities ofjoint ownership must be determined on the date of grant, not at
some future date when the estate vests. Future estates such as remainders, reversions and
executory interests are not held in joint tenancy.
The 1981 Deed purports to grant concurrent ownership of an estate to Ada Craig,
Sharon and Colleen. If the concurrent estate granted by the 1981 Deed is a present estate,
it cannot coexist with an exclusive life estate. On the other hand, if the concurrent estate
granted by the 1981 Deed is a future estate, it cannot by definition be held in joint tenancy.
The trial court is unclear on this issue, stating on the one hand that "[T]he joint tenancy
relationship means that all the joint tenants enjoy the property in its totality. They all have
the right to enjoy the property in its entirety." While on the other hand stating "[A] life estate
gives a person control over property for their life." A joint tenant cannot enjoy a property
in its totality if a life tenant controls the property. Thus, if a joint tenancy and a life estate
are to coexist as the trial court attempts to construe the 1981 Deed, then either the life estate
or the joint tenancy must be less than the law makes them out to be.
The arithmetic of real property is such that the sum of all of the interests equals a fee
simple absolute. A life estate is a present estate which demands a future interest, whether by
reverter, remainder or executory interest. A joint tenancy is a present estate held by
concurrent ownership, with a built-in future interest in the survivor of the joint tenants.
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Taken together, a life estate and a joint tenancy overlap and conflict with one another. The
sum of the parts created by the 1981 Deed cannot be more or less than the whole of the
interests in the Property. Thus, the trial court's finding that the 1981 Deed created both an
exclusive life estate in Ada Craig and a joint tenancy in Ada Craig, Sharon and Colleen is
flawed.
If the terms "joint tenants" and "life estate" cannot be given their fair meanings
without conflicting with one another, than the parties' intent is to be considered. The 1981
Deed must be interpreted to give effect to Ada Craig's intent as found by the trial court.
Ada Craig's Intent
If the 1981 Deed is not clear on its face, the court looks to the intent of Ada Craig to
determine the construction of the 1981 Deed. The Appellants ask this Court to reconsider
its ruling in light of Ada Craig's intent. The trial court found "... that in 1981, Ada Craig
wanted to have her house in which she held the sole interest go to her two daughters, Sharon
and Colleen, upon her death." The trial court also found "... that Ada Craig intended to keep
control and some ownership interest in her home, the property in question, until she died."
If the trial court had interpreted the 1981 Deed in a manner consistent with the trial
court's findings regarding Ada Craig's intent, then the trial court would have found that the
1981 Deed created a present estate in Ada Craig for her life, a future estate in the form of a
remainder in Sharon and Colleen, if they survive Ada Craig, and a possibility of reverter in
Ada Craig and her heirs if both Sharon and Colleen predecease her. This interpretation is
consistent with the arguments put forth by the Appellants at trial. Indeed, any other finding
would defeat Ada Craig's intent.
9

The trial court suggested that a reason for Ada Craig having retained a joint tenancy
interest in the Property was that in the event Sharon or Colleen predeceased Ada Craig, the
Property would not go to their heirs. This is a presumption at best, given that no evidence
of that was presented at trial. In addition, this rationale fails to recognize the legal point that
any one of the joint tenants had the ability to sever the joint tenancy and to make their interest
in the property transferable to their heirs or to a third party. In fact, this is exactly what
resulted from the 1999 quitclaim deed to Carolyn Abbott; the trial court found that Carolyn
Abbott received a 1/3 interest as tenant in common and not as a joint tenant. If Ada Craig
really intended to preclude Appellants' heirs from obtaining an interest in the Property should
they predecease her, a retained joint tenancy interest was not the way to accomplish that. In
an attempt to address a condition that never occurred, that is that one of the Appellants might
predecease Ada Craig, the trial court created a right for Ada Craig that was never intended,
that is that Ada Craig conveyed less than all of the Property to Sharon and Colleen in the
1981 Deed.
Ada Craig intended to convey 100% of the Property to Sharon and Colleen. Whether
Ada Craig intended to do so at the time of the 1981 Deed or at the time of her death doesn't
really matter. The trial court found that this was Ada Craig's intent in 1981 and the evidence
supports that as her intent at least until 1996 when she affirmed her intent in the 1996 Will.
In the 1996 Will Ada Craig specifically devised and bequeathed her estate to the Appellants
and specifically disinherited her other children, including Carolyn Abbott and Appellee
Irvine.
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This Court should interpret the 1981 Deed to give effect to Ada Craig's intent at the
time she executed the deed in 1981, not her intent or state of mind as it might have been in
1999. It is true that Ada Craig executed the 1999 Abbott Deed and that it was probably an
expression of her intent in 1999. But that intent is irrelevant to an interpretation of the 1981
Deed.
Ada Craig retained control of the property during her lifetime with her life estate. As
the Appellants argued with case law, statutory analysis and commentary, the 1981 Deed gave
Ada Craig only a life estate and Appellants ask this Court to so find.
Additional Analysis Supporting Appellants' Ownership of the Property
Appellants assert that the 1981 Deed created only a life estate in the Property for Ada
Craig. The joint tenancy language of the 1981 Deed as it relates to Ada Craig should be
disregarded. A joint tenancy is a concurrent estate. A joint tenancy depends upon "four
unities:" the unities of time, title, interest and possession. The unity of time means that the
interests of the joint tenants must arise at the same time. The unity of title is present only if
the interests are acquired by the same instrument. The unity of interest means that the tenants
acquired identical interest, that is, in fee simple absolute or otherwise. The unity of
possession means a common right of possession and enjoyment.
If one joint tenant conveys his interest to a third party, the recipient acquires an
interest as tenant in common with the remaining joint tenants, who, if more than one,
continue as joint tenants among themselves. Such a conveyance is said to "sever" the joint
tenancy as to the transferring party by removing the unities of time and title. Utah Code Ann.
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§57-1-5(5). The important consequence of a severance is that the right of survivorship is
destroyed between the original tenants and the new tenant.
Ada Craig, the decedent, purported to create a joint tenancy among herself and her
two daughters, the Appellants, pursuant to the 1981 Deed. The 1981 Deed states in relevant
part that Ada Craig quitclaims to,
"... ADA R. CRAIG, SHARON V. CRAIG [Anderson] and COLLEEN R.
CRAIG [Erickson] as Joint Tenants with full rights of survivorship and not as
tenants in common, reserving a Life Estate only for ADA R. CRAIG ..."
in the subject Property. The language of the 1981 Deed contains both a granting clause and
a habendum clause. "A granting clause is that portion of the deed or instrument of
conveyance which contains the words of transfer of a present interest." Black's Law
Dictionary 5th Edition, page 630. The granting language of the 1981 Deed conveys present
title to the Property to Ada Craig and to her two daughters "as Joint Tenants with foil rights
of survivorship and not as tenants in common,...."
"A habendum clause is the clause usually following the granting part of the
premises of a deed, which defines the extent of the ownership in the thing
granted to be held and enjoyed by the grantee. The office of 'habendum' is
properly to determine what estate or interest is granted by the deed, though
office may be performed by the premises, in which case the habendum may
lessen, enlarge, explain, or qualify, but not totally contradict or be repugnant
to, the estate granted in the premises." Black's Law Dictionary 5th Edition,
page 639.
The restrictive or habendum language of the 1981 Deed states that it is "reserving a
Life Estate only for ADA R. CRAIG...." In its Minute Entry Decision and Order relating to
a Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter, the trial court observed that the interpretation
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of the habendum language "reserving a Life Estate only for ADA R. CRAIG" is the crux of
the disagreement between the parties.
A. If traditional construction is applied, the habendum language restricts the granting
language. Therefore, each of the three parties to the 1981 Deed received a joint tenancy
interest in the Property, but Ada Craig's joint tenancy interest was restricted to a life estate
only by the habendum clause, that is she was precluded from severing her joint tenancy
interest and conveying anything more than her life estate.
B. Looking to case law, no Utah case has been decided on this point. However, an
analogous situation was considered by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in Robinson
v. King, 314 S. E. 2d 768 (N.C.App. 1984). In that case the grantor conveyed property to
his sister by quitclaim deed. The relevant part of the quitclaim deed states, "... [grantors]
have granted, bargained, sold and released, and by these presents do bargain, sell and release
unto the said Maggie Robinson [the grantor's sister] all our right, title and interest in and to
[the property].... To have and to hold, all and singular, the said premises before mentioned,
unto the said Maggie Robinson, for and during the term of her natural life [emphasis
added]." Robinson, supra, 314 S. E. 2d at 770.
The North Carolina court noted that the granting clause of the quitclaim deed,
standing alone, appears to give Maggie Robinson a fee simple estate, while the habendum
clause, standing alone, appears to give her a life estate. Robinson, supra, 314 S. E. 2d at 769.
This observation is similar to the instant case. The granting clause of the 1981 Deed,
standing alone, appears to give Ada Craig a joint tenancy interest in a fee simple estate, while
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the habendum clause of the 1981 Deed, standing alone, appears to give to Ada Craig a life
estate.
In Robinson, the defendants, being the proponents of a fee estate in the sister,
presented evidence that the sister thought that she owned the property and that she attempted
to convey the property by will. Robinson, supra, 314 S. E. 2d at 770.
In the instant case, Appellee Irvine alleges that Ada Craig thought that she owned a
concurrent fee simple estate in the Property and that she attempted to convey that interest in
the Property.
In Robinson, the North Carolina court found that the quitclaim deed should be
interpreted to convey a life estate only to the sister and not a fee estate. The North Carolina
court based its analysis on the relevant North Carolina statute, G.S. 39-1 which states:
When real estate is conveyed to any person, the same shall be held and
construed to be a conveyance in fee, whether the word "heir" is used or not,
unless such conveyance in plain and express words shows, or it is plainly
intended by the conveyance or some part thereof, that the grantor meant to
convey an estate of less dignity. Robinson, supra, 314 S. E. 2d at 771.
The Robinson court held that "[U]nder G. S. 39-1, the absence of words of inheritance,
combined with the presence of language limiting the estate to the term of the grantee's life,
should be interpreted to convey a life estate." The Robinson court noted that "[T]his result
has been reached in other jurisdictions where a grant 'to A,' which standing alone would
convey a fee, has been held to convey a life estte [sic] when the granting clause is
accompanied by a habendum clause which refers to a life estate." Robinson, supra, 314 S.
E. 2d at 771. See 4 H. Tiffany, The Law ofReal Property §980 (3d. Ed. 1975).
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The similar statute in the Utah Code is found at Utah Code Ann. §57-1-3 and states:
"A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a conveyance of real estate, unless
it appears from the conveyance that a lesser estate was intended." In the instant case, the
1981 Deed makes reference to a concurrent fee simple title being conveyed in the granting
clause, but it is also apparent from the language of the 1981 Deed that a lesser estate for Ada
Craig was intended.
C.

A supporting interpretation is expressed in legal commentary which states that

"[W]hen language in a deed or will would otherwise be effective to create a life estate but
also contains additional language creating in the transferee a power, either limited or
unlimited, to dispose of the land in fee simple, the prevailing rule in the United States is that
the transferee has only a life estate despite the added power." Roger A. Cunningham,
William B. Stoebuck and Dale A. Whitman, The Law of Property 67-68 (1993). Applying
this analysis to the instant case, the 1981 Deed clearly creates a life estate in Ada Craig, the
transferee, both through the express language and through the joint tenancy. In simplest
terms, a joint tenancy is a life estate coupled with the power to sever the joint tenancy to
create a life estate and a remainder interest. If the 1981 Deed is construed to create in Ada
Craig a life estate, which it does by the granting clause and the habendum clause, together
with the ability to create a remainder interest, then pursuant to the foregoing, the prevailing
rule of construction would hold that Ada Craig had only a life estate, despite any additional
ability to create a remainder interest.
In light of the foregoing, this Court should find that Ada Craig's interest in the
Property was a life estate only and that upon her death, the Property vested in the Appellants.
15

II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS' AN
ACCOUNTING FOR PROFITS AND EXPENSES OF THE PROPERTY FROM THEIR
COTENANTS.
Each cotenant in real property is a fiduciary with regard to the remaining cotenants.
Webster v.Knop. 6 Utah 2d 273, 312 P.2d 557 (1957); also McCreadv v. Fredericksem 41
Utah 388, 126 P. 316 (1912).
The doctrine of merger really has nothing to do with the reconciliation of incompatible
estates. If the estates are incompatible, then the 1981 Deed must be interpreted to give effect
to the intent of the Ada Craig, the grantor. However, the Trial court ruled based upon a
finding that Ada Craig's life estate and the joint tenancy estates of Ada Craig, Sharon and
Colleen are compatible and are separate, recognizable estates and therefore the issue of
merger must be considered.
Commenting on the issue of merger, the trial court noted that "[T]o the extent that one
might say that a life estate and the joint tenancy estate in these circumstances are
incompatible, I am of the opinion that because the joint tenancy estate is the greater estate,
that the life estate would merge into it."
The merger of property interests is defined as follows: "It is a general principle of law
that where a greater estate and a less coincide and meet in one and the same person, without
any intermediate estate, the less is immediately annihilated, sunk or drowned, in the greater."
Black's Law Dictionary 5th Edition, page 892.
The trial court denied the Appellants' claim for an accounting, presumably on the
premise that the Appellants' interest in the Property was not a present interest but was subject
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to Ada Craig's life estate. However, when Ada Craig conveyed all of her interest in the
Property to Carolyn Abbott with the 1999 Abbott Deed, Ada Craig's interests, whatever the
trial court may have interpreted them to be, were merged in Carolyn Abbott and the
Appellants' interests in the Property, regardless of how the trial court may have subordinated
them the exclusive life estate of Ada Craig, became a present interests.
Based on the foregoing, the Appellants' interests in the Property became present
interests on the date of the 1999 Abbott Deed, if not before. Appellants are entitled as a
matter of right to an accounting from the date that their interests in the Property became
present interests. Appellants have asserted that from the time of Ada Craig's readmission to
the care center in January 1999 until her death in July 2003 they were excluded from the
management of the Property and provided no accounting of the profits or expenses of the
Property.
Appellants urge this Court to acknowledge their present interest in the Property at
least from the date of the 1999 quitclaim deed, if not before, and to award them their rights
with respect to the Property by ordering Carolyn Abbott and Appellee Irvine to provide them
with an accounting from the date of their present interest.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPOINTING APPELLEE IRVINE AS
RECEIVER OF THE PROPERTY.
In its ruling, the trial court appointed Appellee Irvine, the plaintiff in this matter,"...
to act as receiver of the property, to undertake the sale of the property,...." Appellants object
to Appellee Irvine's appointment as receiver and urge this Court to reconsider the
appointment of Appellee Irvine as receiver. Appellants ask this Court to consider Utah R.
17

Civ. P., Rule 66 (b), which reads as follows: "Appointment of receiver. No party or attorney
to the action, nor any person who is not entirely impartial and disinterested as to all the
parties and the subject matter of the action can be appointed receiver therein without the
written consent of all interested parties."
Appellants have not consented in writing or otherwise to the appointment of Appellee
Irvine as receiver, as required by Rule 66(b), and because of reservations which they have
regarding such appointment they have declined to do so. Therefore, this Court should
overturn the appointment of Appellee Irvine as receiver.
The trial court awarded Appellee Irvine a 1/3 ownership in the Property. The
Appellants have a 2/3 ownership in the Property. Notwithstanding Rule 66(b), it is contrary
to the principles of equity to award a minority interest owner control over the Property.
Appellee Irvine's appointment as receiver for the Property should be overturned.
CONCLUSION
An exclusive life estate is a present estate and a joint tenancy interest is the concurrent
ownership of a present estate. A life estate and a joint tenancy are incompatible. Statute,
case law and commentary lead to a reconciliation of the two with a finding that Ada Craig's
interest in the Property resulting from the 1981 Deed was solely a life estate. In addition, if
was the obvious intent of Ada Craig at the time of the 1981 Deed that she retain only a life
estate. Therefore, upon the death of Ada Craig, her life estate terminated and the Property
vested in Appellants, and this Court should so find.
If this Court finds that Ada Craig retained some interest in the Property by the 1981
Deed which extended beyond her lifetime, then under the principles of merger, her claim to
18

a life estate was extinguished and nonexistent and Appellants are entitled to an accounting
for their interest in the Property from the date of the 1981 Deed or at least from the date of
the 1999 Abbott Deed in which the interests merged in Carolyn Abbott, and this Court should
so find. If this is the finding of this Court, then the matter should be remanded to the trial
court for additional findings relating to an accounting for the Property.
Utah R. Civ. Proc, Rule 66(b) bars Appellee Irvine from being the receiver of the
Property, and this Court should so find.
ADDENDUM
No Addendum is necessary in this appeal.
DATED September ? _ , 2005.

SWENSEN & ANDERSEN PLLC
HA^
James G. Swensen, Jr. '
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DIVISION
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT D. IRVINE,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT

vs.

Case No. QSO^Q OOO j
SHARON CRAIG ANDERSON and
COLLEEN CRAIG ERICKSON,

JUDGE f W * <•©V-v

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff and complaints of the Defendants and for cause
of action alleges as follows:
1. This is an action to partition certain real property, more particularly
hereinafter described, pursuant to the provisions of § 78-39-1, etseq., Utah Code
Annotated (1953, as amended).
2. Plaintiff and Defendants are residents of Salt Lake County, Utah.
3. The real property which is the subject of this litigation is situate in Salt
Lake County, Utah, and is more particularly described as follows:

16-18-181-013 Commencing 272.25 feet West from the
Southeast comer of Lot 1, Block 12, 5 Acre Plat "A", Big Field
Survey; thence West 66 feet; North 170.1 feet; East 66 feet;
South 170.1 feet to the point of beginning.
4. On January 19,1981, Ada Craig executed a quit claim deed to the
above-described property conveying the same to herself, Sharon V. Craig (nka Sharon
Anderson) and Colleen R. Craig (nka Colleen Erickson), as joint tenants, subject to a life
estate in Ada Craig. Said deed was recorded on January 19,1981, in Book 5202 at Page
1168, as Entry No. 3525030, in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder.
5. On January 21,1999, Ada Craig conveyed her interest in the subject
property to Carolyn Abbott also subject to a life estate by quit claim deed recorded
January 28,1999, in Book 8241 at Page 2974 Entry No. 7237662 in the office of the Salt
Lake County Recorder. The interest of Carolyn Abbott was subsequendy conveyed to the
Plaintiff herein by quit claim deed dated May 20, 2002, and recorded June 3, 2002, in
Book 8605 at Page 1545 as Entry No. 8251901 in the office of the Salt Lake County
Recorder.
6. Plaintiff is the owner of an undivided one-third interest in the subject
property.
7. Defendants are the owners as joint tenants of the remaining two-thirds
interest in the subject property.
8. Ada Craig is the parties' mother and is now deceased.
-2-

9. There are no liens or encumbrances appearing of record on the property,
and Plaintiff has no knowledge of any parties who claim an interest in the property or
who will be materially affected by this action other than these parties.
10. Plaintiff has obtained a title report from Sutherland Tide Company,
and such report is located at the offices of the attorney appearing hereon and may be
used, inspected and copied by the parties to this action.
11. During the last years of Ada Craigfs life, Plaintiff assisted her in the
management of the property as rental units, using the proceeds therefrom to pay the
expenses on the property and pay a portion of Ada Craig's care and support.
12. Plaintiff and Defendants have been unable to agree on the operation
or disposition of the property since some time prior to the death of Ada Craig, and in
fact, as the result of the dispute between the parties, the property is now vacant.
13. Plaintiff has approached the Defendants requesting that they either
purchase his interest therein or consent to the sale of the property with a division of the
proceeds between them.
14. Defendants have refused Plaintiffs request and have refused to
cooperate with Plaintiff in the management and care of the property.

-3-

15. Plaintiff has no objection to maintenance and necessary repairs to the
premises to ready it for sale, but does not wish to become involved in or pay for extensive or unnecessary work to the property.
16. Defendants have undertaken an effort to deny Plaintiff a rightful
interest in the tide to the subject property, including thefilingof a false affidavit with
the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office which asserts that Defendants are the sole tide
holders to the property.
17. Defendants have further caused the locks to be changed on the
premises for the purpose of preventing Plaintiff from entering the premises and otherwise asserting possession as an owner thereof.
18. Without cause and without the approval or participation of Plaintiff,
defendants caused a three-day notice to quit to be served upon the only tenant on the
property, resulting in the vacating of said property by the tenant and loss of further
income.
19. Such effort on the part of Defendants to deny Plaintiff his interest in
the tide to the subject property andrightfulbenefits as an owner thereof has been made
by Defendants in bad faith with an intentional effort to deprive Plaintiff of a property
interest legally and rightfully belonging to him as evidenced by valid conveyances on
record with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office.
-4-

20. Such bad faith on the part of Defendants has necessitated the filing of
this complaint by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff is entitled to relief under § 78-27-56, Utah Code
Annotated (1953, as amended) including his costs, expenses and attorney fees incurred
in bringing this action and in defending his rightful interests in the subject property.
21. The dispute between the parties is ongoing and to undertake any
control of the premises without the participation of the Plaintiff will further the dispute
and antagonism between the parties.
22. Due to the disruptive nature of the relationship between the parties,
Plaintiff believes that the property is in danger of material damage, abuse or neglect
unless a receiver is appointed to take and keep possession of the property, to receive the
rents, to collect debts, and generally do such acts respecting the property as the court
may authorize during the pendency of this litigation.
23. In order to bring the dispute between the parties to an end, Plaintiff is
informed and believes and alleges that a partition by sale of the property, rather than a
physical division thereof, is more equitable to the parties in that although the property in
question contains a number of rental units, it was originally constructed as a single
family residence and the physical partition and apportionment and distribution of rents
and expenses will be impossible.

-5-

24. In the event that Defendants persist in their efforts to assert sole
control of the premises without Plaintiffs consent and participation, Tlaintiff requests
that the court issue an injunction enjoining and restraining the Defendants from
incurring further expenses on the property or taking income therefrom, if any, during the
pendency of these proceedings.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests:
1. That Defendants and each of them appear and answer this Complaint.
2. The court decree partition of the above-described real property among
the parties hereto according to their respective rights.
3. The court decree that the real property be sold in its entirety pursuant
to §78-39-1, etseq., Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), and a division of the net
proceeds thereof among the parties hereto and according to their respective rights
including the costs of the title report obtained by Plaintiff.
4. The Defendants be restrained and enjoined from incurring any further
expenses on the property or taking any income therefrom.
5. A receiver be appointed by this court to oversee and manage the
property during the pendency of this litigation in accordance with the requirements of R.
66, Utah R. Civ. Pro. and that the costs and expenses of such receiver be paid by
Defendants.
-6-

6. For reasonable attorneys1 fees incurred by the Plaintiff in the prosecution of this action by reason of the actions undertaken in bad faith by Defendants
pursuant to § 78-27-56, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).
7. For an order that the costs, disbursements and expenses of this action,
including the costs of partition and sale, and the costs of the receiver, be paid by the
Defendants and be made a lien upon their share of the proceeds of the sale of the real
property.
8. Plaintiff be granted such other and further relief as the court may deem
just and equitable.
DATED this Y~2~

day ofjdg&x, 2003.

^t^ANDERSON
TON
for Plaintiff
Plaintiffs address:
4931 South Fairview Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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STATEMENT OF JlJRISDiC IION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
*. . <i- -* />ri^ p n o ^ as the ™ r.44:^ 4br«l V

N cu transferred (o llie Court of

Appeals by the Ulan CHI; - iu' I 'milt.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OI REVIEW
1.

Whether the Trial Court correctly determined as a Finding of Fact that Ada

R. Craig v

she executed created both a joint tenancy interest

and retained for herself a possessory life estate.

The sta*

review regarding

findings of fact, is that the Utah Court of Appeals will not set aside the Trial Court"s
liibliinr, unless ckails erroneoi is. Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1184 (Utah 2004).
2.

Whether the Trial Court cornrIh <IVhi nniK-d lhal Ada K Craig maintained

a possessory life estate until her death on July 11, 2003 and intended to retain da\ u'-day
control over the property, thereby defeating Appellants' right to an accounting for profits
of the property unhl her di-.ilh

I IK •il.nul.ird ol'review regarding findings of fact, is that

the Utah Court of Appeals will ilot set aside ttic ma
erroneous. Chen v. Stewart, 1"°
3.

Whether the

p

,;

*ss clearly

^ H * ~~ 1 ! 84 <IJtah 2004).

r]

Irvine as receiver of the proper*•

-discretion, properly appointed Robert D.
ihe standard ol res \r\\ is llml llu appointment of a

receiver or the refusal to appoint is in the sound discretion of the Trial Court and the Utah
Court oi Appc.i

: rot ov^Hurn o n appeal unless the Trial Court abused its discretion.

Skirvin v. Mestu, i4i i <-; >os, o/j

; th

0 Cir. Ct. App I

n F nr t|| CL iills determination

is now moot and the Court in its discretion should summarily dismiss this issue on
appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This was a case for partition of that real property which was the personal residence
of Ada R. Craig for most of her life (the "Home"), which was tried before the Utah
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah, Judge Hansen presiding, on September 28-29,
2004. The court issued its oral ruling on October 14, 2004, after having taken the matter
under advisement. The Trial Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Order in favor of the Appellee [Plaintiff] on December 6, 2004, and appointed
Appellee as Receiver to sell the Home.
Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the court on November 10,
2004, which was denied. Appellants filed with the Trial Court another post-trial Rule
59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment on December 20, 2004, which was also
denied.
Appellants appealed from this final post-trial motion to the Utah Supreme Court.
The appeal was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition pursuant to
Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated on February 15, 2005.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Ada R. Craig was the sole owner of her residence, real property located at

251 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Home"), until January 18, 1981. (Trial
Exhibit No.7, Ijl; Transcript Volume II, pp. 5-7).

2.

Ada R. Craig owned the Honu * and n: ;» d il a: ; in T p< Tsonal residence from

approximately January 1973 i 11 itil 1 ler death on Jul) l l , 2003. During that ^ '
slii iiiJiniliiiiu'd lln, HOUR a] her sole expense.

le,

(Trial Exhibit No,7. 1j, , transcript

Volume II. pp. 27-30).
3.

Appellant Colleen Erickson lived in the Home uiulri her' moilrf s r,nv and

suppoi I lot 46 years, including a period of several years after she married and had a child.
(Trial Exhibit No.7, ]\2) Appellant Sli.thm Nuderson liu-d wiili her mother in the Home
for 43 years from 1954 to 1997. (Transcript p.3).
4.

On January 19, 1981, Ada R. Craig executed a Quit-Claim Deed regarding

me IK

.

... iguage, "ADA R CRAIG ... hereby QUIT-CLAIMS to

ADA. R. CRAIG, SHARON V CRAIG and COLLEEN R. < K M< i as Joint Tenants with
fiill rights of survivorship and not as tenants in commoii, reserving a hi** r^
" nVial Exhibit N- ] * <u--cm the "1981 Deed").

Al,
5.

Ada R. Craig su-.

Hi • i

IK-I daughters [Appellants] that she

executed the 1981 Deed because "At the time I signed
n

for

1 of

M-i \o e;u h of you. I vrr: concerned about Mark's [one of Ada's sons] wife causing

some kind ui .

-Inco m\ house itI jeopardy. Also at that time you
i

were single and my other children were married ,

" (Tri.t

No.7,tl).
6.

St

,

, rson testified that she understood that her mother, Ada R.

Craig, intended for her to im

:,:

vkadi and that she would

not receive that inheritance until her mother passed away. (1 ran sen pi. p S I

7.

Colleen Erickson testified concerning the 1981 Deed that, "Shar[on] had a

third and I had a third and my mom had a third, contingent upon the life estate of the
property." (Transcript p. 69, line 9-10).
8.

In the latter part of 1998 it became necessary for Ada R. Craig to move

from her Home for the purpose of receiving extended assistance and care in a local
nursing care facility. (Transcript Volume II, pp. 13-14).
9.

In 1999, Ada R. Craig gave her eldest son, Robert D. Irvine, powers of

attorney by signing a Durable Power of Attorney for the purpose of helping her manage
the Home and assist her with her move into the Highland Care Center at the approximate
cost of $5200 or $5300 per month. (Trial Exhibit No.8; Transcript Volume II, pp 20-22).
10.

At the time Ada R. Craig moved into the Highland Care Center, the only

substantial asset available to her to help pay for her care and other expenses was her
Home. (Transcript Volume II, p. 27).
11.

At the time Ada R. Craig moved into Highland Care Center, Appellants

Sharon Anderson and Colleen Erickson refused to consent to the sale of their mother's
house or her one-third joint tenancy interest, to pay for her care and other needs.
(Transcript Volume II, pp. 31-35).
12.

At the time Ada R. Craig moved into the Highland Care Center, Appellee

and his wife provided their own personal financial assistance for the payment of the
Highland Care Center monthly costs and other needs of Ada R. Craig and paid
approximately $175,000 over the course of 3-4 years for Ada's care. (Transcript Volume
II, p. 26).

13,

On or about January 21, 1999, Ada i\. ciuig, w '

'«. •»-•..*-•.

;

—r

attorney, quit-claimed her remaining one-third joint tenancy interest to another daughter,
Carolyn

^=

JL .

ia

•-.-

:

k

estate, (January 21, 1999 Deed). (Trial

Exhibit No.2, Transcript \ uiainc ii, pp. 35-37, :M, 5 J )
1

<

The January 2 K 1999 deed stated "ADA R. CRAIG also known as RAH S.

Ci ^

. .i

- CAROLYN ABBOTT grantee the following

described tract oi land, ic^ei. u..

*e estate " ( I rial Exhibit No.2;

Transcript Volume II pp 35-37, 51, 53).
15.

On February 2, 1999, Ada R. Craig sent a lettei lo her daughters (the

Appellants) stating i. >

x riting a letter to one of

my children pleading for what already belongs to me. 1 now ii I H nccessai

lo\\nteto

two of my children who have taken the position that the Home that I have owned for over
fifty years m I

«n !x -lones to me ... It was never my intention that each of you receive

one third of my Home until my death ai.

\\ as wr

tien the

funds from the sale of my Home are no longer needed in my behali, it is n:
}

:•

t

receive your share of those funds as was intended when I HP claimed the Home

to the three of us." (Trial Exhibit No. /. lunsnipi ' .Hiuih il
16.

Oi i or about. May 20, 2002, Carolyi \ Abbott conveyed

i inh'tvsf in ili«"

Home io Appellee, Robert D Irvine, for the purpose of furthering efforts to sell Ada's
Home or at - •<

rein and because Appellee had paid nearly all of

Ada's nursing Home expenses. (Trial Exhibit No.3; Iraiviaipi \>liiiiti" II. pp. W-38).

17.

Using his Power-of-Attorney, from approximately January 21, 1999 until

his mother's death, Robert D. Irvine, at the direction of his mother, was able to rent the
Home and use the modest net rental income to help provide for his mother's care.
(Transcript Volume II, pp. 18-22, 26-27, 34).
18.

Ada R. Craig passed away on July 11, 2003.

19.

Immediately following the death of Ada R. Craig, Appellants claimed sole

right and possession to the Home and excluded Appellee from the Home.

Finally,

Appellee brought this action to realize his rightful one-third interest in the Property,
(Complaint, pp.4-6).
20.

Robert D. Irvine had substantial experience in buying and selling real

property and in managing real property and was a logical choice for appointment as a
receiver.
21.

Mr. Irvine was able to quickly accomplish a sale of the Home and at the

hearing for approval of the sale, Appellants instead purchased the one-third interest of
Mr. Irvine. (See Motion for Court Approval of Real Property p. 2).
22.

The Trial Court, based on testimony of the parties and exhibits at trial,

made Findings of Fact as follows:
1. There were two main issues presented at trial by the parties to the Court.
First, what interest, if any, did Ada R. Craig ("Craig") have in the real
property after executing the January 19, 1981 deed; and second, if Craig
owned a joint tenancy interest in the real property following the execution
of the January 19, 1981 deed, was she competent to transfer her interest in
the property to her other daughter, Carolyn Abbott.
2. Based upon the strict application of the words of the deed, the Court
finds that Ada R. Craig conveyed to herself and to her daughters Sharon
Craig Anderson and Colleen Craig Erickson the property in joint tenancy,

with i ull rights oi survivorship, and in addition to her one-tl lit d joii it
tenancy interest, Craig also granted to herself a life estate iti tlle ie it
property.
3. IIie Court also finds that Ada Craig intended to grant un[to] herself and
to her daughters a joint tenancy interest in the property, and [in] addition to
her one-third joint tenancy interest, Craig also intended to grant to herself a
life estate in the real property.
4. there was not any believable or persuasive evidence that Ada Craig
intended to abandon control of the day to day operations or control of the
property while Ada was alive. The evidence suggests that she intended to
retain control o\ er the proper!} .
5. Following the execution of the 1981 Deed, Ada Craig, Sharon Anderson
and Colleen Erickson shared a one-third interest in the totality '>f the
property as joint tenants, with rights of survivorship.
6. Ada Craig retained a joint tenancy interest so that it one or both oi her
daughters predeceased her, a share or all of the property would return to
Craig, and not go to another family member of the co-owner daughters. She
was interested in giving the property to 1ter daughters if she died, bii1 was
not interested in giving the proper!) u one ^f her daughters' heirs i! \
daughter predeceased her. She therefore intended w* main a joint tenancy
interest in the property.
7. The life estate Craig retameu in auuiuon lo ner joint tenancy interest was
also retained for another important purpose: By creating a life estate only
for herself, Ada intended to retain day-to-day control of the property. The
'reserving a life estate only" language in the 1981 deed was it itended to
reserve the life estate only in the name of Ada, and i lot : ; the name of her
daughters, which excludes her two daughters from contra ^ r the property
while Ada Craig was alive.
8. The evidence shows that Ada Craig said she owned the property
following the 1981 deed, and also that Colleen Erickson testified that this
was a l/3 rd , l/3rd, l/3 rd ownership relationship between Ada, Colleen
Erickson, and Sharon Anderson. Other witnesses who testified for plaintiff
supported this interpretation of Ada Craig's ownership intent.
9. Whether one looks to Ada's intent, or looking at the actual language of
the 1981 deed, the result is the same, as specified above. (Findings of Fact.
PP. 2-3).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.-

The Trial Coi irt correctly found that the 1981 Deed created both, a

possessory life esU»*

•eipreting a

deed, the intent of the grantor prevails. Khalsa v. Ward, 101 P.3d 843, 845 (Ut. Ct. App.
2004). The primary rule of construction for a deed is that the intent of the grantor should
be determined and carried out. 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 193 (2005). The Trial Court
determined, as a Finding of Fact that Ada R. Craig intended to grant a joint tenancy
interest to herself, Sharon Anderson and Colleen Erickson, each with 1/3 interests in the
Home for the purpose of giving the Home to them if she passed away. (See Findings of
Factfflf2-7). In addition, the Trial Court found that Ada R. Craig intended to retain a life
estate so that she could maintain the day-to-day control and use of the Home for her
lifetime. (See Findings of Fact Tftf 2-7). Therefore, unless Appellants demonstrate clear
error by the Trial Court, this Court should uphold the Trial Court.

Courts have

determined that a life estate and a tenancy in common are not inconsistent estates and can
be held in the same person at the same point in time. See United States v. Gibbons, 71
F.3d 1496, 1500 (10th Cir. Ct. App. 1995). Therefore, the Trial Court's findings should
stand.
2.

The Trial Court correctly determined that the Appellants are not entitled to

an accounting for rents and expenses of the Home through the period of time that Ada R.
Craig was still alive and in need of the meager rental income which helped contribute to
her living needs. The Trial Court determined, as a matter of fact, that Ada R. Craig's
intent was to maintain the day-to-day control of the Home while alive, thereby excluding
her two daughters from control of the Home while she was living. (See Findings of Fact f
7). The Trial Court further determined that Ada R. Craig's intent in 1981 was that her
daughters receive the Home upon her death, but not prior. (See Findings of Fact *[[ 6).

Based on the facts and the language of the 1981 Deed and the January 21, 1999 deed, the
Trial Court correctly determined that Ada R. Craig had properly retained a life estate.
(Conclusions of Law, p. 2). Therefore, unless the Appellants demonstrate clear error and
the Court determines that the Trial Court incorrectly determined the law, the Court should
uphold the Trial Court's findings. Moreover, the possessor of a life estate is entitled to
all of the property's rents and profits. See Hammond v. McArthur, 183 P.2d 1 (CA. 1947)
(Wherein one joint tenant conveyed to the other a life estate in the property with the right
to all of its rents and profits - the court held that the granting of the life estate did not
terminate the joint tenancy insofar as the right of survivorship was concerned).
3.

The Trial Court acted properly within its discretion to appoint Robert D.

Irvine as receiver of the Home under its close supervision. Mr. Irvine had substantial
experience with real estate and was credible and trustworthy. Mr. Irvine's instruction
from the Trial Court was to sell the property under the close scrutiny of the Trial Court.
Mr. Irvine procured a sale, but Appellants preempted the sale when on the eve of court
approval of the sale, Appellants instead offered to purchase the 1/3 interest of Mr. Irvine.
The purchase of the one-third interest of Mr. Irvine by Appellants has rendered the issue
moot.
4.

Appelle prevailed at trial and on all post-trial motions. Appellee is entitled

to his costs of appeal in accordance with Rule 34(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure and upon presentation of a bill of costs.
ARGUMENTS

I.

A.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
THE 1981 DEED CREATED A POSSESSORY LIFE
ESTATE AND A JOINT TENANCY INTEREST IN THE
GRANTOR CONSISTENT WITH THE GRANTOR'S
INTENT.

The Standard of Review for Findings of Fact is Clear Error.
Although the Trial Court made Findings of Fact, Appellants have made no

reference to set those aside, have marshaled no evidence in opposition, and have relied
solely on their technical legal argument. Not surprisingly, the Trial Court found against
Appellants on every factual issue presented.
Appellants have stated to this Court that the standard of review is merely the
standard of "correctness". Appellants have flatly ignored the Findings of Fact which
supported the Trial Court's Conclusions of Law. The issues raised by Appellants are
mixed issues of fact and law. For such issues, the Court must divide its deliberations
between legal issues and fact issues. The correct standard for overturning a Trial Court's
findings of fact is "clearly erroneous". In short, the Court would have to find that the
Trial Court so clearly misconstrued the facts that it was clearly erroneous. This Court
normally gives deference to the Trial Court which has seen and heard the witnesses and
their testimony.
"To successfully challenge an ultimate finding of fact, 'an [A]ppellant must first
marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence
is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most
favorable to the court below.'?t Parduhn v. Bennett, 112 P.3d 495 (Utah 2005) (quoting
Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1184 (Utah 2004). A Trial Court's findings of fact will

not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Chen 100 P.3d at 1184. A Trial Court's
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Khalsa v. Ward, 101 P.3d 843, 845 (Ut.
Ct. App. 2004) (citing Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist, 63 P.3d 705, 709 (Utah 2002)).
The burden is on Appellants to present and overturn the Trial Court's Findings of
Fact. Concerning the Clear Error standard, the Supreme Court has said, "We have no
business disturbing the District Court's ruling 'simply because we would have decided
the case differently,' but only if based 'on the entire evidence, [we are] left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Georgia v. Ashcroft,
539 U.S. 461, 463 (2003).
Ultimately, since Appellants have made no attempt to marshal evidence to
overturn the Findings of Fact, this Court must necessarily accept those Findings as
determined by the Trial Court. The judgment in favor of Appellee must stand.
B.

When Interpreting a Deed, the Intent of the Grantor Must Govern.
Out of care and concern for her daughters, who were single and still residing at

home, in 1981, Ada R. Craig made arrangements to provide them with some security
when she passed away. She did so by executing a deed to them as joint tenants with her,
each of them owning a 1/3 interest. By reserving to herself a life estate, she intended to
maintain the use and control of the Home during her life. Her care and concern for her
daughters was not rewarded in kind when she really needed help.
The Trial Court correctly applied long-standing rules of construction to the 1981
Deed when it gave the deed meaning consistent with the express language of the deed
and with Ada R. Craig's intent. This Court has said that while interpreting a deed, the

intention of the parties, drawn from the whole deed must govern. Khalsa v. Ward, 101
P.3d 843, 845 (Ut. Ct. App. 2004). In construing a deed, a court will determine intent
from the four corners of the document and look to parol evidence if ambiguous. RHN
Corp. v. Veibell, 96 P.3d 935, 945 (Utah 2004). Utah courts will interpret deeds in the
same manner as contracts. Holladay Duplex Management Co., L.L.C v. Howells, 47 P.3d
104, 105 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002).
The Trial Court determined in its Findings of Fact that Ada R. Craig intended to
grant unto herself and to her daughters, Sharon Craig and Colleen Erickson,a 1/3 joint
tenancy interest in the Home. (See Findings of Fact p. 2 ^ 2-3). In addition, the court
found that Ada intended to retain a life estate in the Home. (See Findings of Fact p. 2 ^j
3). Ada R. Craig did this with the intent to retain the day-to-day control over the Home
during her lifetime, and furthermore, to give the Home to her daughters when she died,
but not prior. (See Findings of Fact p. 3 *[flf 6-7).
These findings are consistent with Ada R. Craig's actions. Ada intended to retain a
possessory interest and from 1981 until 1999 continued to live in, maintain, remodel, and
improve the residence. (Transcript Volume II, pp. 9-14). Thereafter, she appealed to her
co-owner daughters to sell the Home so she would have her 1/3 share to use toward her
living and care expenses. (Trial Exhibit No.7 ^j 2-3). The daughters refused so she
appointed her eldest son, Robert D. Irvine as her agent to rent the Home and use the rents
to assist with her abundant health care costs at the Highland Care Center. (Trial Exhibit
No.8; Transcript Volume II, pp. 18-20). Ada R. Craig was competent and understood her
needs and desires. (Findings of Fact, p 4, ^[11-13).

By construing the 1981 Deed according to its plain language and consistent with
Ada R. Craig's intent, the Trial Court acted in accordance with long-standing rules of
deed construction. As stated in paragraph A above, it is the responsibility of Appellants to
attack the evidence and Appellants have made no effort to rebut the conclusions of the
Trial Court.
Interpreting the 1981 Deed otherwise, would work against the manifest best
interests of Ada R. Craig and would produce unjust results. Ada's undeniable interest
was that her only substantial asset, her Home, would be preserved as her residence for
life, or an income for life. The 1981 Deed also assured her and her daughters that they or
she (Ada) would receive the fee interest at the death of the last survivor while the joint
tenancy existed. Even the Appellants' testimony corroborates Ada Craig's intent with
regard to the property. Colleen Erickson testified concerning the 1981 Deed that,
u

Shar[on] had a third and I had a third and my mom had a third, contingent upon the life

estate of the property." (Transcript, p. 69, line 9-10).
As it turned out, Ada's retention of a one-third interest was also the only way to
provide assistance for her living and care costs. Accordingly, the intent of Ada R. Craig
was—and therefore the Trial Court's determination was—that Ada R. Craig granted to
herself a joint tenancy interest as well as a life estate. The Trial Court was correct as a
matter of law, and there was ample support for its factual findings.
C

Ada R. Craig's Joint Tenancy Interest and Life Estate are Distinct and Separate
Legally Consistent Property Interests.

No one disputes that Ada R. Craig could convey the Home to herself and her
daughters as joint tenants with right of survivorship. No one disputes that Ada R. Craig
could convey the Home to her daughters and retain for herself a life estate. Appellants
argue that she cannot do both at the same time. Appellee did not agree and neither did
the Trial Court.
Without citing case law, Appellants argue that a merger occurs when a greater and
lesser interest in real property are conveyed or retained. However, where the intent of a
grantor is clear, courts have had no difficulty in allowing the two interests to be given full
effect.
Courts have held that a life estate and a tenancy in common are not inconsistent
estates and can be held in the same person at the same point in time. See United States v.
Gibbons, 71 F.3d 1496, 1500 (10th Cir. Ct. App. 1995). See also Cole v Cole, 294 P.2d
494, 495 (Ca. Ct. App. 1956); Hammond v. McArthur, 183 P.2d 1 (CA. 1947). In
Hammond, Rowley, a widow, and McArthur, an unmarried woman, acquired certain real
property as joint tenants. Id. Later, McArthur conveyed to Rowley a life estate in the
property by deed. Id. Hammond, Rowley's successor, claimed that the conveyance of the
possessory interest extinguished the joint fee ownership and survivorship rights, claiming
the rights were inconsistent. Id. McArthur argued that the grant of the life estate did not
convey to Rowley anything that she did not already possess and that the life estate was
not repugnant to the rights of survivorship. Id at 3-4.

The court found for McArthur and held that when one of two joint tenants in fee
simple makes a conveyance of his or her interest for life, upon the termination of the life
interest, the joint tenancy, as it originally existed, revives. Id at 8.
This is consistent with the finding in United States v. Gibbons. In,that-case, a
husband and wife owned a Home as joint tenants. Id. The divorce decree awarded the
wife a conditional right to live on the property during her lifetime. Id. The court held that
the wife held a life estate, or possessory interest, in the whole of the property and a
remainder interest, or tenancy in common interest, of one-half in the property. Id at 1499.
Although the separation agreement severed the joint tenancy, the wife still maintained a
simultaneous possessory and remainder interest via a life estate and tenancy in common
estate in the Home. Id.
The case at hand is similar. Ada R. Craig intended to grant to herself and to two of
her daughters a 1/3 fee interest each in joint tenancy with full right of survivorship. Ada
R. Craig also intended to retain a life estate in order that she could maintain the day-today control, possession and enjoyment of the Home until her death. Appellant, Sharon
Anderson, understood that this meant she would not receive her interest in the Home until
her mother passed away. (Transcript p 5, lines 5-10).

Colleen Erickson clearly

understood that her mother owned a one-third interest in the Home. The two estates in
Ada R. Craig are not incompatible but are legally sustained and are consistent with her
intent as determined by the Trial Court. Therefore the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law by the Trial Court must stand.

D.
Appellants Misstate the Holding of Robinson
Supporting Their Position.

v. King, the Sole Authority

The Appellants would have the Court use antiquated technicalities to override the
intent of Ada R. Craig even though misapplied and misconstrued. The bedrock of their
position (that a habendum clause granting a life estate which accompanies a granting
clause conveying a fee simple interest in real estate must then limit the grantee's interest
to a life estate only and no fee interest) is based on a single North Carolina case,
Robinson v. King.

However, Appellants have misunderstood and misstated the holding

of that case.
The court in Robinson relied on a previous North Carolina case, Triplets when it
said:
[T]his doctrine, which regarded the granting clause and the
habendum and tenendum as separate and independent portions of the
same instrument, each with its especial function, is becoming
obsolete in this country, and a more liberal and enlightened rule of
construction obtains, which looks at the whole instrument without
reference to formal divisions, in order to ascertain the intention of
the parties, and does not permit antiquated technicalities to override
the plainly expressed intention of the grantor...."
Robinson v. King 314 S.E.2d 768, 772 (N.C. App. 1984) (emphasis added).
The court further stated, "For forty years after Triplett the North Carolina Supreme
Court consistently construed deeds according to the overall intent expressed in the
instrument." Id at 773. The court then concluded that:
The surrounding circumstances and evidence apart from the
quitclaim deed are ambiguous at best, and fail to show a clear intent
on the part of the grantors to convey a fee simple.
Id at 775 (emphasis added).

The court clearly based its holding on a determination of the intent of the grantor
after reviewing the deed itself, the Last Will and Testament of the decedent and other
surrounding circumstances. Id at 774. As the holding states at page 775, there was no
clear intent to grant a fee simple. Id at 775. The court used modern rules of deed
construction to ascertain the intent of the grantor and did not use antiquated technicalities
to interpret the deed as Appellants are urging the court to do in the case at hand.
Appellants also rely on the definition of "Habendum Clause" in the Black's Law
Dictionary 5th edition to support their position and have quoted this portion in their brief:
A habendum clause is the clause usually following the granting part of the
premises of a deed, which defines the extent of the ownership in the thing
granted to be held and enjoyed by the grantee. The office of 'habendum' is
properly to determine what estate or interest is granted by the deed, though
office may be performed by the premises, in which case the habendum may
lessen, enlarge, explain, or qualify, but not totally contradict or be
repugnant to, the estate granted in the premises.
Black's Law Dictionary 5
(emphasis added).

Edition, page 639 (Appellants' brief page 12)

A habendum clause is traditionally the "To have and to hold" clause. The granting
clause in the 1981 Deed which states, "Ada R. Craig, grantor of Salt Lake City, County
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby Quit-Claims to Ada R. Craig, Sharon V. Craig and
Colleen R. Craig as Joint Tenants with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in
common . . ." grants to Ada R. Craig, and two of her daughters, Sharon Anderson and
Colleen Erickson, each a 1/3 joint tenancy with full rights of survivorship. As the Black's
Law definition states, the language afterward, or habendum clause as Appellants label it,
can lessen, enlarge, explain or qualify but not totally contradict or be repugnant to, the

estate granted in the premises. It would be absurd for Ada R. Craig to grant unto herself a
1/3 joint tenancy interest with full right of survivorship only to take it away directly
afterward.
The explanation brought forth by Appellants defies all reason and common sense.
Furthermore, the Appellants' explanation results in a habendum clause that is
contradictory or repugnant to the premise or granting clause. The dictionary defines
repugnant as inconsistent or incompatible. (See Merriam Webster's Online Dictionary).
To grant a joint tenancy interest and thereafter, take it away only to supplant it with
something less is clearly inconsistent, contradictory and illogical. Moreover, this would
be in opposition to the function of a habendum clause, and therefore cannot possibly
define the intent of the grantor and therefore the 1981 Deed.
In order to be consistent with the Black's Law definition brought forth by
Appellants, the habendum clause after the premise or granting clause might say
something to limit, qualify, or expand the grant. Examples might be "with right to all
rents" or "with right to exclude all other owners" or "with no alcohol on the premises" in
order to properly coincide with the Black's Law definition.

These are examples of

language that serve to lessen, enlarge, explain or qualify but not contradict or be
repugnant to the premise.
The language immediately following the premise or granting clause in the 1981
Deed states, "Preserving a Life Estate only for Ada R. Craig." (emphasis added). This
language, if it is a habendum clause, is clearly contradictory and repugnant to the
granting language. Therefore, the language functions not as a habendum clause, but as a

reservation of a life estate in the grantor. If it is a habendum clause, the fact that it
contradicts logic and the premise itself works contrary to the proper function of a
habendum clause. As such, it is more likely that the language results in a granting clause
followed by a reservation if antiquated technicalities are to serve our purposes for deed
construction.
Based on the foregoing, the court should look at the intent of the grantor in
construing the 1981 Deed. Appellants must therefore bring forth enough evidence to
show clear error by the Trial Court in determining the intent of Ada R. Craig before the
Trial Court's Findings of Fact can be set aside. To put it bluntly, Appellants have no
legal authority to support their position and no credible factual evidence to dispute the
findings of the Trial Court. The Trial Court's findings must stand.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
THE APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN
ACCOUNTING FOR PROFITS AND EXPENSES OF THE
PROPERTY THROUGH THE PERIOD OF TIME THAT
ADA R. CRAIG WAS STILL ALIVE.

Ada R. Craig's nursing Home costs exceeded $5,000.00 per month. Amazingly,
while not contributing anything to the costs of their mother's care and having received a
magnanimous gift of two-thirds ownership in the Home, Appellants would now have the
Court take back the meager rental income Ada received and used to partially fund her
care.
Ada R. Craig, at all times, retained a life estate in her Home. Appellants argue
once again that the Court should ignore her obvious intent and eliminate her life estate as

a result of the 1999 deed to Carolyn Abbott. Once again, Appellants argue without legal
authority and in the face of overwhelming law in favor of Appellee.
During the continuance of a life estate in real property the life tenant is entitled to
the possession, control, and enjoyment of the property. 31 C.J.S. Estates § 36 (2005).
The courts will presume a merger only if equity demands it. Miller v. Martineau &
Co., 983 P.2d 1107, 1113 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Federal Land Bank v. Colorado
Nat'lBank, 786 P.2d 514, 515 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) ("'Equity does not favor the doctrine
of merger . . . .'").1
Appellants claim that they are entitled to an accounting of profits and expenses
because Ada R. Craig conveyed all of her interest in the Home to Carolyn Abbott in the
1999 deed. In the eyes of Appellants, the life estate and the joint tenancy interest merged
in Carolyn Abbott contrary to the express language and intent of the deed. As a result,
they argue that Appellants' interests in the property became present interests on the date
of the 1999 deed if not before. (See Brief of Appellant pg 17 1f 1-2).
The Quit-Claim Deed dated January 21, 1999 contains the following language,
"ADA R. CRAIG also known as RAE S. CRAIG ... grantor hereby QUIT-CLAIM[s] to
CAROLYN ABBOTT grantee the following described tract of land... Reserving to the
Grantor a life estate" (Trial Exhibit No.2) (emphasis added).

1

See alsoMontgomery v. Browder, 930 S.W.2d 772, 781 (Tx. Ct. App. 1996) (Holding that the doctrine of merger of
estates is not favored, and does not apply where it is the intention of the parties that it should not apply and when it
is in the interest of the holder of the two estates to keep them separate); Western Bank of Las Cruces v. Malooly, 895
P.2d 265, 270 (NM. Ct. App. 1995) (Courts will not compel a merger of estates where the party in whom the two
interests are vested does not intend such a merger to take place, or where it would be inimical to the interest of the
party in whom the several estates have united).

The possessory life estate and joint tenancy interests of Ada R. Craig could not
have merged in Carolyn Abbot because the deed clearly reserves the life estate to Ada.
Ada R. Craig retained her possessory life estate interest until she passed away in 2003.
With her possessory life estate interest, Ada R. Craig retained her right to, "[Possession,
control, and enjoyment of the property" throughout her lifetime. 31 C.J.S. Estates § 36
(2005). At no time did Carolyn Abbott, or later Robert D. Irvine, claim ownership or use
of income derived from rental of the Home. At all times, the rents were used solely for
the benefit of Ada R. Craig.
Even if technical rules required that the life estate interest and the joint tenancy
interest united in Carolyn Abbott, a merger would be contrary to the best interests of the
grantor because Ada R. Craig needed and attempted to utilize her ownership in the
property to pay for her health care expenses. Therefore, equity would dictate that no
merger took place.
A further technical defect in the argument of Appellants is the dates of ownership
of Appellee, Robert D. Irvine. Appellants have asked for an accounting form January 21,
199 through July 11, 2003. Mr. Irvine received a conveyance from his sister, Caroline
Abbott on May 20, 2002. Thus, prior to that date, he had no ownership rights or control,
except acting as an agent for Ada R. Craig. If Appellants' arguments were accepted, Mr.
Irvine, at worst, would owe to Appellants an accounting from May 20, 2002 until July 11,
2003, when Appellants immediately excluded him from the Home.
However, we need not pursue this line of thinking further because the plain
language of the deed clearly reserves a life estate in the grantor, thereby resulting in a

conveyance of the joint tenancy interest only to Carolyn Abbott. The Trial Court clearly
determined the intent of Ada R. Craig with regard to the 1999 deed (a factual
determination). Appellants have offered nothing to overturn the Findings of the Trial
Court. As a result, Appellants' request for an accounting of income and expenses of the
property fails and the holding of the Trial Court must stand.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN APPOINTING ROBERT D. IRVINE AS RECEIVER
FOR THE SALE OF THE HOME.

Appellants suffered no harm or prejudice, but they still want to dispute the
appointment of Mr. Irvine as receiver. However, the Trial Court properly applied its
discretion when it appointed Appellee as receiver of the property under its direct
supervision. Mr. Irvine has spent his career buying, selling, managing, and developing
real property. The sale of a Home under the supervision of the Trial Court seems a
reasonable task for Mr. Irvine.
The court bases its authority to appoint a receiver on its inherent equitable power.
Interlake Co. v. Von Hake, 697 P.2d 238, 239 (Utah 1985) (A receivership is an equitable
matter and is entirely within the control of the court.) (citing Shaw v. Robison, 537 P.2d
487, 490 (Utah 1975)).
"In determining whether to continue a receivership or discharge the receiver the
court will consider the rights and interests of all parties concerned . . . ." Shaw 537 P.2d
at 490. A receiver is an officer of the court acting under its direct supervision. Interlake
Co. 697 P.2d at 240. Therefore, a receiver has limited power and must seek advice from
the courts. Id.

The appointment of a receiver or the refusal to appoint is in the sound discretion of
the Trial Court and will not be overturned on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is
shown. Skirvin v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668, 673 (10th Cir. Ct. App. 1944). See also Milwaukee
& M.R. Co. v. Soutter, 154 U.S. 540, 541 (1864); Lee v. Farmers Co-Op. Ass'n of
Mountain View, 113 P.2d391, 393 (OK. 1941).
Mr. Irvine was familiar with the property and had managed the property for his
mother, Ada R. Craig. In addition, Mr. Irvine has vast experience managing property.
Therefore, Mr. Irvine was the person most able to meet the requirements of a receiver
under the circumstances. The Trial Court justifiably determined that he was qualified and
limited his authority to arranging a sale.

When Mr. Irvine brought a final sale

arrangement to the court for approval, Appellants instead asked the court if they could
jointly purchase the 1/3 interest of Mr. Irvine at the offered price and the Trial Court
granted their request.
The Trial Court adequately protected the interests of all parties through its close
supervision and Mr. Irvine effected a sale. Appellants were unable to demonstrate harm
or prejudice at trial, and have suffered no harm. They have neither alleged nor shown
harm to this Court.

If there is no harm, then what is the complaint?

It may be

appropriate for this Court to adopt an adage sometimes utilized in athletics, i.e. "No
Harm - No Foul." Regardless of whether the Trial Court was right or wrong (and
Appellee does not concede that it was wrong), it is a moot point. The Trial Court gave
the order, the receiver fulfilled his duty and Appellants now are the fee owners of the
property. The Court should therefore summarily dismiss this claim.

IV.

APPELLEE PREVAILED AT TRIAL AND IS ENTITLED
TO RECEIVE FROM APPELLANTS HIS COSTS

Rule 34(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that upon affirming an
order or award, the Appellee should be awarded his costs. Appellee has incurred costs
and expenses which are the subject of this Rule. The Court should award Appellee his
costs of appeal upon presentation of such costs.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court correctly determined that a deed executed in 1981 created both a
joint tenancy interest and a possessory life estate Home of the grantor, Ada R. Craig,
consistent with her intent. The Trial Court determined within its Findings of Fact that
Ada R. Craig intended to retain both interests in the Home. Long established rules of
deed construction require that a grantor's intent prevail over antiquated technicalities and
arbitrary rules of construction. Therefore, a court should not set aside the Trial Court's
findings unless clearly erroneous, thereby preserving the grantor's intent. Appellants
have not shown clear error.
The Trial Court correctly determined that the Appellants are not entitled to an
accounting of profits and expenses for the period of time Ada R. Craig was still alive.
The plain language of the 1999 deed clearly granted to Carolyn Abbott the joint tenancy
interest while reserving a life estate in Ada R. Craig. The Trial Court found that this was
also consistent with Ada R. Craig's intent to retain the day-to-day control of the property
until she passed away. Therefore, as the holder of a possessory life estate, Ada R. Craig

was entitled to the benefit of possession, enjoyment and rental income from the Home to
supplement her abundant health care costs until she passed away.
The Trial Court acted properly within its discretion when it appointed Appellee as
receiver for the Home. Mr. Irvine was familiar with the Home because he managed it for
his mother while she received care at Highland Care Center.

He had substantial

experience buying, selling, and maintaining real property. In addition, the Trial Court
closely supervised every action. Furthermore, Appellants have failed to show any harm.
However, the issue is moot because the Appellants have purchased the interests of Mr.
Irvine and are now owners of the Home.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the holdings of the Trial Court must stand and
Appellee should receive an award of his costs on appeal.
Dated this / ^ d a y of October, 2005.
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Quit-Claim Deed
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QUIT-CLAIM DEED
ADA R. CRAIG also known as RAE S» CRAIG
0f

SALT LAKE CITY

QUIT-CLAIM

, County of

SALT

LAKE

grantor
, State of Utah, hereby

to

CAROLTN ABBOTT

grantee
for the sum of
. DOLLARS,

of SALT LAKE C U T , UTAH
TEN AMD NO/100-

and other good and valuable consideration
the following described tract of land in
State of Utah:

County,

J

Commencing 272.25 feet West from Southeast Corner Lot,.I, Block 12,
5 Acre Plat "A", A Big Field Survey; West 66 feet; North 170.1 feet;
East 66 feet; South 170.1 feet to begijcuiing.
Reserving to the Grantor a life estateIj'll

li!

H

WITNESS the hand of said grantor
, A-D.

day of

, this

sX&rtf'

Signed in the presence of

| •

&J3^r

I Ada. R. Craig

STATE OP UTAH,
County of Salt Lake
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£ /

day of Jl^f^^^^
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personally appeared^efore me
Ada R. Craig a l s o knovn as RAE S. CRAIG
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Trial Exhibit 3
Warranty Deed
dated May 20,2002
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WARRANTY DEED
10
00
M'

CABOLYN ABBOTT
of SALT LAKE CITT\UTAH
CONVEY
and WARPwANT

, County of

SALT LAKE

grantor
, State of Utah, hereby

to

KOBEKX D. IRVINE

i;

grantee
for the sum of
DOLLARS,

of

SALT LAKE CXTI, UTAH
TEH AND NO/100
and other good and valuable consideration
the following- described tract
of land in
SALT LAKE
State of U t a h :

County,

Commencing 272-25 f e e t West from S o u t h e a s t
C o r n e r L o t 1 , B l o c k 1 2 , 5 Acre P l a t " A " ,
A Big E i e l d S u r v e y ; West 66 f e e t ; N o r t h 170-1
f e e t ; E a s t 66 f e e t ; South 1 7 0 - 1 f e e t t o b e g i n n i n g .
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WITNESS, the hand

of said grantor

Signed in the Presence of

, this

^XQ^h-

day of

'

^g^t^^L
Carolyn Aobott

i;

STATE OF UTAH,
County of

S a l t Lalce

On the
"2^ £? ^
day of
personally appeared before me
Carolyn Abbott
the signer
_ _
/ £ ^ 5 § \
>
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of t h e within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that
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Trial Exhibit 7
Correspondence by Ada R. Craig
dated February 2,1999
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February 2, 1999

Dear Colleen;

I didn't think I would ever be writing a letter to one of my children pleading for what
already belongs to me. I now find it necessary to write to two of my children who have taken the
position that the home that I have owned for over fifty years no longer belongs to me. I have
provided a comfortable home for bothof you for your entire lives. I didn't think that I would
ever need the services of a care center, but like many others I now find myself in that position. I
know that you enjoy being comfortable, I too would enjoy being comfortable for the balance of
my life. I don't need a spacious house, but I would at least like the comfort of a private room of
my own in this care center. At the time I signed a quit claim deeding one third of my home to
each of you, I was concerned about Mark's wife causing some kind of a problem that could place
my house in jeopardy. Also at that time you were single and my other children were married and
living on their own. There have been many changes since then, both of you are now married like
my other children and have husbands to see to your needs. I don't have a husband to see to my
needs, all I have is my home and I need the funds from the sale of my home. It was never my
intention that each of you receive one third of my home until my death and you know that as well
as I do. I have never asked for financial help from any of my children and don't intend to start
now. I worked very hard for many years remodeling and improving my home to make it a good
home for my family. I spent a lot of money in the process, my money, not yours.
Sharon you told me you would not sign a quit claim deed back to me because Colleen
would get mad at you and never let you see little Mark again. Shame on you Colleen for using
your son as a bargaining chip against your mother. It's becoming very obvious to me that my
comfort doesn't hold very high priority with either of you. As you are aware Bob now has power
of attorney over me and all my affairs, and in that power of attorney any and all prior powers of
attorney of any nature are revoked and terminated. Bob has asked you both for information and
papers to assist us in taking care of my affairs. Colleen you told him that you didn't have to give
him anything. Let me remind you Colleen you are and have been living in my home for 46 years
using my furniture and my belongings. The items that Bob asked for belong to me, not you. I
am asking you now to either bring them to me or have them available to be picked up by
February 8th. The following are the items that I would like:
1-My 1998 bank statements and checks (copies are available from the bank for $600.00)
2-Items from my safety deposit box
3-My purses and wallet together with credit cards, etc.
4-My equitable life policy (medical) and card
5-All my social security information and card
6-A11 my 1998 paid bills including medical
7-Copy of my will
8-All my medicare information, bills and card
9-My 1997 income tax copies (federal and state)

10-My light and magnifying instrument
11-My hearing aid coupons
12-Balance of my credit union savings account or an explanation as to the use of the funds
13-My metal can and its contents
Please call me and tell me if youarc going to bring these or if I need to arrange to have
them picked up.
I love all my children and grand children and desire to see them all. My needs have
changed drastically in just a short while and I need your cooperation. When the funds from the
sale of my home are no longer needed in my behalf, it is my desire that you will receive your
share of those funds as was intended when I quit claimed the home to the three of us.

J-p^-&^

Trial Exhibit 8
Durable Power of Attorney
of Ada R. Craig
dated January 11,1999
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OCT-17-1900 01:27

DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that I, Ada Rae Craig, have made, constituted
and appointed and by these presents do make, constitute and appoint Robert Douglas Irvine, my
true and lawful attorneyforme and inrayname, place and stead, giving and granting unto my said
attorney full power and authority to do and perform all and every act and thingrequisiteand
necessary to be done in connection with my affairs, including, but not limited to, dealing with any
real or personal property that I may own or may hereafter acquire; to receive, collect and recover all
sums of money, debts and accounts due me; to sue and use all other lawful meanstocollect all such
money, debts, and accounts; to compromise all claims by or against me;topayfiummyfondsall
of my just debts and obligations; to expend funds for my support and maintenance; to create a
revocable or irrevocable trust during my lifetime andtotransfer my property to the trustees thereof;
which trust may extend beyond my lifetime;tocreate and sever joint tenancies of property; and to
arrange and pay for any medical or nursing home care thatl may require during my lifetime* THIS
POWER OF ATTORNEY SHALL NOT BE AFFECTED BY MY DISABILITY, I hereby ratify
and confirm all that my said attorney Robert Douglas Irvine may lawfully do and cause to be done
by virtue of these presents, and I hereby specifically and completely revoke and terminate any and
all powers of attorney of any nature previously executed and granted by me.
IN WITNESS WHERJEOF, I have hereunto set my hand this / /

day of January, 1999.

g4 1k fe^4
Ada Rae Craig

STATE OF y^J&Js

~r

)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me t h i s / /
Ada Rae Craig.
^

day of January, 1999, by

NCTAAYfUBUC
CMJWVLLWAXTOM

feUTaw
r 10.1000
-UTA»

My Commission Expires:

^//fiflffi

U/i4nc<i
/

24VQ52

Residing &m*^^y*fo>fc
|

*~f&

Partial Transcript
Bench Trial
September 28 & 29,2004
P
A
R
T
I
A
L
T
R
A
N
S

c

R
I
P
T

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT D.IRVINE,

Case No. 030920001

Plaintiff,

Appellant Court No. 20050138

vs.
SHARON CRAIG ANDERSON and
COLLEEN CRAIG ANDERSON,
Defendants.

•PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT BENCH TRIAL SEPTEMBER 28 & 29,2004*
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

offered my s i s t e r and I each $10,000 i f we would deed t h e
property t o him.
Q

Okay.

My q u e s t i o n was d i d n ' t your s i s t e r

threaten

you or did she t h r e a t e n you i n any way w i t h n o t s e e i n g h e r son
Mark?
A

She d i d n o t .

Q

Has your sister ever threatened you to not see her

son A

She had not.

Q

- if you didn't cooperate with her?
How many years did you live in the house,

approximately with your mother, or from what period of time to
what period of time, if that would be easier?
A

From 1954 to 1997.

Q

You were born when she was living in that house?

A

Yes.

Q

You didn't pay your mother any money for an interest

in the house, did you?
A
Q

No.
In your responses to the interrogatories, there was

question asked what you paid for the house and the answer that
was provided was you paid $10, care, love and affection.

And

understand the care, love, and affection part, but actually to
be completely accurate you didn't even pay the $10 for an
interest in the house; isn't that true?

regarding the specific terms of the Will - or excuse me, of the
1981 deed, did she?
A

Only that she wanted Colleen and I to have the

property.
Q

Now, isn't it true that she wanted you to essentially

inherit that home upon her death?
A

That's correct.

Q

And your understanding was you wouldn't get that

inheritance until she died.
A

Correct.

Q

Did you receive the letter dated February 1999 that

we marked as Exhibit 7 that's before you?
A

I did.

Q

Did that come m

A

Yes, it did.

Q

Did you contact your mother in response to the letter

the mail to you?

about the ownership interest in the house?
A

No, I did not.

Q

In fact you didn't object to your mother in any way

about what the ownership interest in response to that letter;
isn't that true?
A

I -

Q

You didn't call your mom up and say, "This isn't

right."
A

You didn't call Bob up and say, "That's not true."
My mother wouldn't understand.

I couldn't call my

you the property completely,, other than her life estate, did
she?
THE COURT: I don't understand the question.
MR. CARTWRIGHT:
Q

Okay.

(BY MR. CARTWRIGHT)

Your mom didn't tell you back

around 1981 that she was signing that deed and by•signing that
deed she was giving away all of her interests, except for her
life estate?
A

Shar had a third and I had a third and my mom had a

third, contingent upon the life estate of the property.
Q

Okay, so it was your understanding that, that Sharon

owned a third of the property. It was a third hers, correct?
A

Well, actually wouldn't become a third of hers.

Q

Well now -

A

Well I guess what I'm saying.

Q

Okay.

A

Sharon had, did have a third.

Q

All right, so it was your perception that Sharon

It is a third.

owned a third and you owned a third and your mom owned a third
arfd when she died you and Sharon would own, together you'd own
it all?
A

With full rights of survivorship Sharon and I would

end up with it.
Q

Okay.

Is that correct?

And before your death you each owned a third?
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
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1

A

I live at 4931 Fairview Drive, Salt Lake City,

3

Q

What's your background or occupation?

4

A

I f m a general contractor.

5

Q

Now you are a son of Ada Irvine, Ada Craig; is that

2

Utah.

6

correct?

7

A

Yes, sir.

8

Q

What I'd like you to do is explain to the Court the

9

relationship with Ada, with you, the children, and the

10

defendants and how the family is put together.

11

could walk over here to the board.

12

here.

13

your dad, where the family starts there.

14

So if you

Stand up and come over

Here's a marker and why don't you start with Ada and

A

My mother and father married.

15

Ada Rae Snow, later Ada Irvine.

16

1935.

Her maiden name was

They married in I believe in

They had three children.

17

Q

So three children from your mother and Ray?

18

A

Yes.

19 I

Q

Did they ultimately divorce?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Do you remember approximately when that was?

22

A

I believe that was 1974.

23

Q

This was before the home was purchased that we're

24 I here talking about today, correct?
25 I

A

Yes, that's correct.

1

Q

What's the address of that home, do you recall?

2

A

(Inaudible) 251 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City.

3

Q

How was that home acquired originally?

4

A

My father purchased it.

5

Q

Do you recall approximately when that home was

6

purchased by your father?

7

A

1948.

8

Q

Was this before or after the divorce?

9

A

After.

10

Q

Your mom was later remarried; is that correct?

11

A

She was, I believe in 1949.

12

Q

So the home was purchased after the divorce with

13

Ray but before she subsequently remarried.

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

Who did she remarry?

16 J

A

Forrest

17

Q

Write his name down.

(inaudible).
And to be clear, why don't

18

you put a line and put Ada next to that too to show they were

19

married.

20

together?

Did they have - did Forrest and Ada have children

21 I

A

22

Q

Which children did they have?

23

A

Mark (inaudible) and Sharon.

24

Q

Write their first names down there.

25

Yes.

And what happened to this marriage?

All right.

1

A

Forrest

2

Q

Okay.

(inaudible) passed away in 1979.
Put at the bottom there something like

3

Forrest died in 1979.

4

can sit back over here.

5
6
7
8

Thank you.

That's good for now.

Do you know why your father, Ray, purchased the
home for Ada after the divorce?
A

Well, he had an ex-wife and three children and she

didn't work and so he was our support.

9

Q

10

about 1981.

11

on the house that we're talking about?

All right.

I'd like to direct your attention to

Do you recall your mother signing a deed in 1981

12

A

Do I recall her signing a deed?

13

Q

Are you aware that she did?

14

A

I am.

15

Q

But you didn't know she signed it?

16

A

No, I did not.

17

MR. CARTWRIGHT:

18

THE COURT:

19

You

Q

All right.

No.

May I approach?

Of course.

(BY MR. CARTWRIGHT)

I'm showing you what's been

20

marked as Exhibit 1 which purports to be a Quit Claim Deed.

21

Have you seen this document before?

22

A

I have.

23

Q

In what context have you seen the document?

24

A

Pertaining to my mother's needs for moving into the

25

care center and this being the only asset that she had.

1

was $ 1 7 3 . 6 8 .

S h e w a s r e c e i v i n g s o c i a l s e c u r i t y i n t h e amount

2

of, I b e l i e v e $770 o r $ 8 0 i n 1999.

3

and 2003 w h e n she p a s s e d a w a y b u t I b e l i e v e it w a s $780 i n

It e s c a l a t e d b e t w e e n 1 9 9 9

4 1999.
5

Q

So if y o u take $780 in s o c i a l s e c u r i t y p l u s

6

retirement o f $ 1 7 3 a n d t h e a n n u i t y , t h a t ' s a p p r o x i m a t e l y

7

$1,000 a m o n t h .

8

A

Y e s , sir

9

Q

D i d she h a v e a n y o t h e r i n c o m e b e s i d e s t h a t 9

10

A

11

Q

No.
Did your m o t h e r , A d a , d i d t h e r e c o m e a time w h e n

12

she left t h e home a n d ended u p in t h e h o s p i t a l o r a c a r e

13

center 9

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

When was that9

16

A

Well, in 1998 she, a couple of times, two or three

17

times, as a m a t t e r o f fact w a s in e i t h e r a c a r e c e n t e r o r a

18

rehab area o r t h e h o s p i t a l .

19

generally t h e h o s p i t a l .

20
21

Q

St

Mark's Hospital was

So she w a s in S t . M a r k ' s H o s p i t a l f o r h e a l t h

reasons 9

22

A

23

Q

Do y o u know what t h e h e a l t h r e a s o n s w e r e 9

24 I

A

Well, various health reasons.

25

Yes.

stomach p r o b l e m s

I t h i n k s h e h a d some

She had an operation on her stomach at one

1

point in time, just several reasons, urinary infections

2

seemed to be quite frequent.

3 J

Q

Did she ever go to a psychiatric unit in the

hospital or anything like that?
5 I

A

Not to my knowledge.

6

Q

You mentioned she was in St. Mark's Hospital.

What

7 J happened to her after she left St. Mark's Hospital?
A

She was in St. Mark's Hospital and was then

9 I discharged to a facility on 700 East I believe called the
10

Woodland Care Center.

She arrived there in the afternoon one

11

day and I was there as well as the - I don't remember whether

12

both Sharon and Colleen were there or one but 1 was there and

13

they got her situated in a room, there were others in that

14

room and had her settled down and resting and I left that

15

afternoon.

16

there where I'd seen her the previous day.

17

desk and asked where they had moved Ada Craig to, thinking

18

that they'd moved her to another room or something.

19

said no, she's not here any more, she's back in the St.

20

Mark's Hospital due to a problem that occurred here last

21

night.

22

Q

A health problem?

23

A

They were a little bit upset with me to begin with.

I returned the following morning and she wasn't
So I went to the

They

24

They said that her son, Mark, had some by and apparently had

25

raised some kind of confusion and ruckus because of what he

A

Yes.

Q

When was that?

A

The 11th of January 1999, a week after she'd moved

into the Heritage Eastridge.
Q

So how did you get the authority to make those

decisions?
A

The first morning that I visited my mother and she

tfas so unhappy, m

fact she'd hurt herself trying to get into

use the bathroom, hurt her arm.
didn't want to be there.

She just was crying.

She

She wanted to go back where she had

been to the Highland Care Center and I said, mom, you know,
there's nothing I can do.

You've given that authority to

someone else and they're making those decisions for you and I
can't change that and a lady by the name of Mary Carlson who
worked at the Heritage Eastridge was there and she said,
"Well, Mrs. Craig, you can make a new power of attorney is
you want to.

If you don't want to be here you can go to the

Highland —
MR. SWENSEN:
THE COURT:

Objection, Your Honor, hearsay.
Sustained as to what this person at the

care center said.
Q

(BY MR. CARTWRIGHT)

So what did your mother do in

response to this conversation?
A
attorney.

She said well then let's change the power of

1

MR. SWENSEN:

Objection, Your Honor, hearsay.

2J

MR. CARTWRIGHT:

Your Honor, here I'm offering this

3 I testimony to s h o w h e r i n t e n t i n e n t e r i n g i n t o t h i s a g r e e m e n t .
4
5
6

THE COURT:

I'm going to allow the testimony as to

what was said f r o m a n y s o u r c e .
Q

(BY MR. CARTWRIGHT)

1

marked as E x h i b i t 8.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. CARTWRIGHT:

H)
11

Q

It's clearly

(inaudible).

I'm showing you what's been

Exhibit what?
Exhibit 8.

(BY MR. CARTWRIGHT)

Have you seen this document

before?

12

A

Yes,

13

Q

What i s

24

A

It's a durable power of attorney-

15

Q

Do you see the signature line on the document?

16

A

I do.

17

Q

Whose name appears there?

18

A

My mother's.

9

Q

Are you familiar with the signature contained on

20

sir.
it?

the durable p o w e r o f a t t o r n e y 9

21

A

Y e s , I am.

22

Q

How are you familiar with this signature here?

23

A

Well, as you can see that's considerably different

24

from t h e s i g n a t u r e that w e s e e o n t h e 1 9 8 1 d e e d .

As my

25

mother h a s g o t t e n o l d e r a n d h e r h e a l t h w a s n o t a s g o o d a s it

1

had been in the p a s t , her signature was not as good as it had

2

been in the past.

3

Q

So how do you know that it's your m o m ' s signature?

4

A

I watched her sign it.

5

MR. CARTWRIGHT: I offer Exhibit 8.

6

THE COURT:

7 J

MR. SWENSEN:
THE COURT:

9 I
Q

Received.

(BY MR. CARTWRIGHT)

With this p o w e r of attorney in

hand, what did you do as far as m a n a g i n g her care?

12
13

No objection, Your H o n o r .

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 received)

10
11

A n y objection?

A

Well, that first day that I visited her at the

Heritage Eastridge and she wanted to change the power of

14 I attorney, I immediately went down to Highland Care Center to
15

see if there was space available for her and they said that

16

there was not right at that time but there w o u l d be in a

17

couple of weeks.

18

to endure where she was for a couple of w e e k s and as soon as

So I went back and told m y m o t h e r we'd have

19 t that time concluded we'd be able to m o v e w h e r e she wanted to
20
21
22
23

be.
Q

What role did you have in the p r e p a r a t i o n or the

signing of the power of attorney?
A

I contacted an attorney to have it prepared and

24

called for a fellow to come and be the notary and 1 was there

25

as well and asked the lady at the care center if she would

witness it.
Q

How was your mother's eyesight at the time she

signed this document?
A

My mother had macular degeneration which I have

myself and her eyesight was not wonderful.
notary that signed it, read it to her.

The man r the

If I were to just

hand it to her, she wouldn't be able to read it without a
magnifying glass.
Q

Did your mother express any objections or questions

regarding the power of attorney?
A

No.

Q

Could you see whether she wanted to sign it or

didn't want to sign it or anything?
A

She was anxious to sign it.

Q

Why was that?

A

Because she knew she could move and be away from

there.
Q

All right.

So you ultimately helped her get back

to Highland Ranch?
A

Yes.

Q

How did she do once she was back at Highland Ranch?

A

Very good.

Q

How much did Highland Ranch cost?

A

Highland Care Center?

Q

Excuse me?

1
2

A

Did you j u s t say H i g h l a n d R a n c h ?

It's

Highland

Care C e n t e r .

3

Q

Oh, okay, Highland

Care.

4

A

H o w m u c h d i d it

5

Q

Right.

6

A

W h e n w e f i r s t m o v e d in t h e o n l y r o o m t h a t t h e y

cost?

7 | available w a s a r o o m w h e r e she s h a r e d w i t h a n o t h e r
as I recall it w a s a r o u n d $ 4 5 0 0 a m o n t h .

and

After we were

a short t i m e w e c o u l d see t h a t it w o u l d b e b e t t e r
10 I her own room.

lady

there

if she

My mother had a hearing problem as well

she loved h e r TV.

12

her w e s t e r n m u s i c , c o u n t r y - w e s t e r n

13

enjoy it, the sound h a d to b e u p a l i t t l e l o u d e r t h a n

14

for m o s t .

15

excellent h e a r i n g so t h a t w a s a p r o b l e m

16

felt we just w o u l d b e b e t t e r o f f if w e

17

room for h e r so t h a t s h e c o u l d live a n d e n j o y t h e t h i n g s

18

she wanted.

19

Q

H o w m u c h d i d the p r i v a t e

20

A

It was another $700 or $800 a month.

21
22
23

forgotten
Q

She had a large screen TV and she

loved

station and for her

room

for h e r .

to
maybe

had
So w e

just had a

had

and

11

T h e lady t h a t she s h a r e d t h e r o o m w i t h

had

just

private

cost?

I've

exactly.
Were there activities

Highland C a r e

for t h e r e s i d e n t s at

the

Center?

24

A

Yes, many.

25

Q

Did A d a p a r t i c i p a t e

in a n y o f t h o s e

activities?

that

1

of the challenge and my mother enjoyed it there.

2

Q

3

was there?

4

A

I did.

5

Q

Approximately how much did you spend on your

6

Who paid for Highland Care Center costs while she

mother' s behalf?

-7

A

About $175,000 roughly.

8

Q

That was over three or four years?

"5

A

Yes sir.

I should qualify that and say my wife and

I, not just I.
%

m

Q

I'm showing you what's been marked as Exhibit No.

'2 ,

5. Do you recognize this?

9*

A

Yes.

Q

What is it?

A

That's a list of the expenses that my wife and I

contributed to her care.

On the right-hand side is another

column where my brother contributed to her care as well, my
%

brother Raymond.
Q

Does this contain a record of the - well, how did

you contribute payments on your mother' s behalf?
A

I just made checks and deposited to her account.

We wanted everything to go through her account that pertained
to her.

|P

Q
Exhibit 5?

Are those deposits reflected in these records, in

1

A

They are.

2

Q

And how did you make expenditures on your mother's

3

behalf?

4

A

With her checking account.

5

Q

And those are also reflected in Exhibit 5?

6

A

Yes, they are.

7J

Q

Whose handwriting is on the records here?

A

This is my handwriting.
MR. CARTWRIGHT: I offer Exhibit 5.

10 I

THE COURT:

11

MR. SWENSEN:

12

THE COURT:

13

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 received)

14

Q

Any objection?
No objection.
It will be received.

(BY MR. CARTWRIGHT)

Could Ada have paid for own

15 I expenses rather than you doing that?
16

A

With her funds?

17

Q

What I mean is f did she have the resources to meet

18

her needs?

19

A

Only with her home.

20

Q

Did Ada ever discuss with you who she believed

21
-22
i3

owned the home?
A

She felt she owned the home.

She thought it was

hers.

M

MR. SWENSEN:

25

MR. CARTWRIGHT:

Objection, Your Honor, hearsay.
Again, Your Honor -

1

MR. SWENSEN:

2

THE C O U R T :

Hearsay.
Overruled.

I'm going to have to have

3 j specifics as to what she said, not what he thinks she
4

thought.

5
6

Q

There's no foundation for t h a t .
(BY MR. CARTWRIGHT)

A l l right.

Did you h a v e

conversations w i t h your m o t h e r about who o w n e d the home?

7

A

Many t i m e s .

8

Q

When's the first time you recall h a v i n g that

9

conversation?

10
11

A

the Heritage Eastridge down to the Highland Care C e n t e r .

12
13

In those first couple of days w h e n we m o v e d from

Q

So w h e n she went back to H i g h l a n d Care Center for

the second t i m e ?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

And where was your mother when you w e r e there with

17

A

In her room.

IB

Q

I said that w r o n g .

16

19

her?

Where was your m o t h e r w h e n she

made t h o s e s t a t e m e n t s ?

20

A

In her room.

21

Q

Who was there w h e n those statements were m a d e ?

22 I

A

Oh golly, from time to time there m i g h t have been

23

several different people b u t p r i m a r i l y m y s e l f or - primarily

24

myself.

25

Q

On how m a n y o c c a s i o n s did you m o m - what d i d your

1
2

mom say when she talked about she owning the home?
A

3
4

Well, she'd say MR. SWENSEN:

Objection Your Honor, this would be

hearsay.

5 1

THE COURT:

6

Continue.

7

THE WITNESS:

Overruled.

M y mother when she married Forrest

8

Craig truly thereafter, he started remodeling the home and

9

that went on for 20 years or m o r e , making changes and

10

improvements and my mother lived through all of that, the

11

times when the bathrooms were torn up or the kitchen was torn

12

up or some part of the house and it wouldn't be like a

13

contractor coming in and do it.

14

they had the funds to do it but my mother participated in

15

that and she would say many times, that's m y home, I'm the

16

one that got up on the sawhorses and sanded the sheetrock,

17

I'm the one that helped paint, I'm the one that helped clean

18

up the mess after all that.

19
2U

Q

He did it as he had time and

That's m y home.

When did she make those statements?

Were those

made during remodeling or when we're talking -

21

A

At the Highland Care Center, frequently.

11

Q

Did your mother make a distinction between owning a

23

one third interest with the life estate or owning a home or

24

did she talk about that?

25

A

No.

Q
2

she'd signed?

3

A

4
t5

Did she e v e r talk to y o u a b o u t t h e 1 9 8 1 deed that

W h e n w e t a l k e d about h o w w e w e r e g o i n g t o p a y for

her to be at the H i g h l a n d Care C e n t e r , h e r o n l y a s s e t w a s h e r
J home.

>6

Of course s h e e x p e c t e d that t h e g i r l s i n h e r m i n d ,

that they would d e e d that b a c k t o h e r .

I c o n t a c t e d an

7 I attorney and he h a d u s get a title r e p o r t .

W e g o t a title

8

report and that's w h e n w e found o u t t h a t t h e i r n a m e s w e r e o n

9

the deed.

I talked t o m y m o t h e r about it a n d s h e said, y e s ,

10

she remembered doing t h a t .

11

probably never thought that t h a t w o u l d h a p p e n t o h e r like w e

12

don't think it'll h a p p e n to u s , t h e y ' l l h a v e a n e e d or w e ' l l

13

have need for those t h i n g s in o u r later life b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s

14

she needed it and —

15

Q

I guess like m o s t o f u s , she

Let's focus o n t h e time w h e n s h e d i s c o v e r e d or

.16

after you contacted t h e a t t o r n e y a n d y o u t a l k e d s p e c i f i c a l l y

27

about the terms of t h e 1 9 8 1 deed.

18

statements b y your m o t h e r about t h e n a t u r e o f t h e interest

§5

she held and the d a u g h t e r s h e l d ?

D o y o u recall a n y s p e c i f i c

3ft

A

W h y it w a s that w a y ?

Stt

Q

Right.

[22

A

I, of course, asked her why it was done and she

HI

told me that he son Mark had married just prior to that and

24

that was an unfortunate situation for him.

%% J girl who was working in a law firm.

He had married a

I don't know whether she

1

was a paralegal or at least affiliated w i t h a law firm and

2

Mark and this girl were going through a nasty divorce and m y

3

mother said they were worried that she w o u l d cause them some

4

grief over this house.

5

Q

That's what I w a s told b y m y mother.

Did the specific context of h o w m u c h the daughters

6

owned as compared to h e r , what she owned ever come up

7

1999?

8
9

A

m

Just that she owned a third of the house plus the

life estate, the right to use the house, she couldn't

10 I mortgage it or sell it but she had the right to use it or
11

rent i t .

12

Q

13

the house.

14

other than a life estate or did she m a k e any statements like

15

that?

16

A

A l l right.

Did she ever say that she didn't own anything

No, no.

She felt it was her h o m e .

17

THE COURT:

18

THE WITNESS:

19
20
21

So she mentioned she owned a third of

Q

I'm sorry, sir?
She said it was h e r h o m e .

(BY MR. CARTWRIGHT)

Did you or your m o t h e r take

any actions to obtain funds out of the h o m e for her care?
A

Yes.

We had an attorney contact - Colleen and

22

Sharon had an attorney by this time.

W h e n w e m o v e d m y mother

23

into the Highland Care Center, number o n e , that very day,

24

Sharon said to me we need to sell the home and I said that's

25

good idea.

That's basically what was said.

Q

When you refer to Sharon, you're talking about one

of the defendants 9

2
3|

A

The daughter, Sharon, yes.

Please ask the question

4 J again.
5I

Q

I've forgotten what I asked.

I've forgotten where

§\ I was at so let me start over there.

You were talking about

7

obtaining funds to pay for her care.

You talked about

8

Sharon's statement.

51

A

What did Sharon say?

We were standing in the hall —

KM

MR. SWENSEN:

It's hearsay again.

It

THE COURT:

12
k

MR. SWENSEN:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. SWENSEN:

15|

THE COURT:

~&\

MR. CARTWRIGHT:

1?

THE WITNESS:

Pardon me?
Hearsay.
As to your client?
Yes.
Overruled.
Go ahead.

We were standing m

£B j ]ust moved our mother down there.

the hall.

We had

I was there, my wife was

£ H there, my two sons, Sharon and her husband were there.
|S

assisted, helping us take mother down to the Highland Care

It j Center.
2f

Sharon was pleased and happy that that was happening

because now mom was going to be happy where she was.

23
r
*s

They

Of

course we knew that Highland Care Center was going to expect
\
I

24 j to be paid and Sharon just said, "We need to sell the house,"
25

and I said "That would be a good idea" and that's what was

said.
Q

(BY MR. CARTWRIGHT)

Did you follow through with

Sharon on selling the house?
A

Yes, we talked about it and I got a call from

Colleen, telling me never to call Sharon again, never talk to
her again.
Q

Did she say why?

A

In between all the words that I was hearing, I

don't recall that she said why.
Q

You don't need to say the words but can you be more

specific about what you talked about?
A

She spent most of her time just calling me names

and telling me what she thought of me and so on.
Q

Did you ever participate in a Quit Claim Deed from

your mother to Carolyn regarding the property?
A

I did.

Q

Tell me what happened with regard to this

transaction.
A

Well, when we talked to mother and explained to her

the problem with the ownership of the home, she thought that
- she said that the girls would be willing to sign it over
which they were not but we contacted an attorney and he
reviewed the title report and said, well, she owns a third of
the house plus the right to use it.

She can either live in

the house or she can rent the house but she can't sell the

house and so we talked about it and decided, well, maybe we
better rent the house and at least get some return to help
pay toward mother's expenses.
Q

I'm showing you what's been marked as Plaintiff's

Exhibit No. 2.

Do you recognize that document?

A

I do.

Q

What is it?

A

It's a Quit Claim Deed from my mother to Carolyn

Abbott, my sister.
Q

Do you know who prepared this deed?

A

It was prepared by Larry Moore at Ray, Quinney and

Nebeker.
Q

This deed has a date at the bottom of January 21,

1999, is that when you recall it being prepared?
A

I believe so.

Q

Do you see a signature at the bottom of the deed?

A

My mother's signature, yes.

Q

Did you see her sign that?

A

I did.
MR. CARTWRIGHT: I offer Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.
THE COURT:
MR. SWENSEN:
THE COURT:

Any objection?
No objection, Your Honor.
Received.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 received)
Q

(BY MR. CARTWRIGHT)

Why was the property deeded to
^/i

Carolyn?
A

Larry Moore advised my mother and I that she could

salvage the one third of the house and probably ought to deed
it to another party and he said, Bob, you probably ought to
encourage your mother not to deed it to you because you have
power of attorney and it would appear as though you were
trying to take a part of her house and he said, you have
other brothers and sisters and I said, yes, I have a brother
Ray and a sister Carolyn.

My brother lives in California, my

sister lives in Salt Lake.
deed it to your sister.

And he said I'd advise her to

So we talked to mother about it and

she said that would be fine, that's what we ought to do and
so that's what happened.
Q

Who was present at the time that Ada signed the

Quit Claim Deed to Carolyn?
A

Myself, of course my mother and myself and Daryl

Thaxton who is a notary public.
Q

Anyone else m

the room that you remember?

A

I don't remember anyone else being m

the room,

whether there was a nurse's aid or not I don't recall.

They

were always in or out but I don't recall anyone else.
Q

Do you remember approximately what time of day it

was when she signed it?
A

Oh golly, I don't.

Q

Do you remember Ada's demeanor at the time she

1 I signed the deed?
2

A

She was fine.

Q

How did she know what she was signing if she had

i

3I

4 difficulty

reading?

5

A

I t was read to her.

6

Q

Difficulty seeing?

71

A

It was read to her.

8

Q

Do you recall who read the deed to her?

9

A

I believe I read the Quit Claim Deed to her.

40 I

Q

Could you tell whether your mother knew where she

.12

A

Oh, she knew where she was.

13 J

Q

Could you tell whether she knew what she was doing?

14

A

She knew what she was doing.

15 j

Q

How could you tell?

16

A

My mother was sharp.

17

Q

Was she sharp on the day she signed the deed?

IB f

A

Yes, she was.

45

Q

Now, you ultimately received an interest in the

^1

was?

;50

house; is that correct?

£i

A

I did.

'Tl

Q

Could you explain how that happened?

23

A

Well, three years later, I believe three years

24

later, my sister Carolyn because we'd never gotten any

~25

cooperation from the others, we continued to pay for mother's

I

36

1

care and Carolyn said,

2

house, Bob."

xx

You ought to have that portion of the

And so she deeded it to me.

3

Q

Did you pay any money for that?

4

A

No.

5

Q

Did Carolyn pay any money to Ada for the Quit Claim

6

Deed that went to her?

7

A

No.

8

Q

What was the understanding - well, are you aware of

9

what Ada's understanding was of why she was signing her

10

interest away to Carolyn?

11
12

A

She was signing her interest away to protect it,

frankly with the intent of all of the girls signing it all

13 back to her so that we could use those funds to care for her.
14
15

Q

Now, how do you know that's what your mother's

intentions were?

16 ]

A

Because we discussed it, talked about it.

%1

Q

I'm showing you what's been marked as Plaintiff's

18] Exhibit No. 3.

Do you recognize that document?

p

A

I do.

20 ]

Q

What is it?

|1

A

It's a warranty deed from my sister Carolyn to me

k

for the third of the property that had been deeded from my
mother to her.
Q

is
<*& -

Do you see the signature down there that says

Carolyn Abbott below it?

A

I do.

21

Q

Do you know whose signature that is?

3

A

My sister Carolyn's.

4

Q

How do you know that?

5

A

Well, I was there to witness it.

6

I saw her sign

her it.

7

MR. CARTWRIGHT: I offer Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. SWENSEN:

Any objection?
No objection.

M

THE COURT:

11

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 received)

12

Q

Received.

(BY MR. CARTWRIGHT)

Do you know whether your

13 mother ever contacted her daughters either orally or in
14

writing r e g a r d i n g e v e r y o n e ' s c l a i m s t o t h e

15

A

Yes, she did.

16

m writing.

17

Q

property?

She contacted them both orally and

Let's talk about the oral part first.

Do you

18

recall any specific occasion when Ada contacted Sharon or

19

Colleen?

20

A

Well, she talked to them on the telephone several

21

times and w o u l d a s k a n d t h e y d i d n ' t w a n t

to t a l k a b o u t

22

They said it w a s a p r o b l e m t h e y d i d n ' t w a n t t o d i s c u s s .

it.

23

Q

Now how do you know that she called them?

24

A

I was there a time or two when she had but she

25

would tell me about the calls as well.

A

February 2nd, 1999.

Q

Could you turn to Page 2 of that?

What does that

say in the handwriting on Page 2 9
A

All my love, mom.

Q

Do you know whose handwriting that is?

A

That's my mother's.

Q

How do you know that 9

A

I watched her sign it.

Q

Would you explain how this letter came to b e 9

A

As I mentioned a moment ago, she wasn't making any

progress in talking to them and so we discussed maybe writing
a letter and sending it to them so that she could have some
of these things that she wanted and needed and discuss how
her affairs needed to be taken care of.

That's how it came

about.
Q

On the first page of the letter, m

almost the

middle of the first paragraph, there is a sentence that
begins, "At the time" do you see that?
A

Say that again.

Q

"At the time I signed".

Could you read that

sentence out loud please 9
A

"At the time I signed a Quit Claim deeding one

third of my home to each of you I was concerned about Mark's
wife causing some kind of a problem that could place my house
in jeopardy."

1

Q

Do you know w h a t that s e n t e n c e r e f e r s to?

2

A

W e l l , just as I m e n t i o n e d e a r l i e r , M a r k has m a r r i e d

3

a girl that had l o o k e d for a law firm a n d t h e y w e r e g o i n g

4

through a nasty p r o b l e m and I don't know w h e t h e r it w a s m y

5

mother's idea or C o l l e e n or Sharon's idea to d o this d e e d but

6

the story that I w a s told b y m y m o t h e r w a s t h a t t h e r e w a s

7

concern about M a r k ' s w i f e or e x - w i f e - t o - b e g e t t i n g i n v o l v e d

$

in the house and c a u s i n g some p r o b l e m s for t h e m .

t
10

Q

All right.

N o w t h e letter I see is t y p e d and I

assume your m o t h e r d i d n ' t type i t 9

*
*
1

11

A

N o , she d i d n o t .

tZ

Q

Explain how this went from your conversation to the

11

final form.

W

A

Well, my mother and I composed the letter there

m

H i her room and then my son Scott typed it for her.
16 j

Q

Then what did Scott do with the type written n o t e 9

i!

A

He gave it back to - I don't know whether he gave

!£

it to me or m y m o t h e r b u t t h e n we r e a d it a n d r e v i e w e d it and

£3

my mother approved it and signed i t .

20
21
22
23

Q

Do you recall a n y specific c o m m e n t s y o u r - w h o read

it after it w a s t y p e d u p 9
A

I b e l i e v e m y son read it a n d I b e l i e v e I read it as

well.

H\

Q

I mean-

25

A

To her

1

Q

Ohf to her?

,2

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

*3 j
4
5J

Q

Do you remember any specific comments that your mom

had once it was read to her by either you or Scott?
A

No, she was satisfied with it and as you can note

4\ by the way she signed it, all my love, mom, my mother loved
7| all of her children and grandchildren.
Q

Do you know what happened to this letter after your

mother signed it 9
A

We mailed it certified mail to Colleen and Sharon

and then their attorney asked for copies and he was given
copies as well.
MR. CARTWRIGHT:
THE COURT:

Offer Exhibit 7.

Any objection?

MR. SWENSEN:
THE COURT:

Okay.

No objection, Your Honor.
Received.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 received)
Q

(BY MR. CARTWRIGHT)

You had mentioned earlier

about how Sharon and Colleen were not selling, did not agree
to sell the house or their interest m

the house or whatever.

A

Right.

Q

Do you recall any response of your mother

specifically to Sharon not agreeing to convey whatever
interest in the house?
A

She said, "I could understand Colleen acting this

way but I can't understand Sharon treating me this way."
Q

In regards to your sister, Carolyn, do you owe her

any money?
A

No.

Q

Owe her any debts or obligations at all?

A

No.

Q

Does she owe anything to you?

A

No.

Q

Has your mother Ada ever told you that, other than

her life estate, she gave the rest of the interest in the
house to anyone?
A

No.
MR. CARTWRIGHT: That's all I have.
THE COURT:

Cross examination.
CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. SWENSEN:
Q

Mr. Irvine, I just have a couple of questions to

htsfr't*

clarify some points here.
A

Okay.

Q

In the diagram that you've put on the board you

indicated that the divorce occurred m

1944.

WZ-4

is you said the house was purchased in 1945.
A

M8.

Q

1948?

A

I'm sorry, M 8 .

My recollection

Q

Did he know your mother had a home?

A

Yes, I told him that she did.

Q

So you broached the subject with him about your

mother' s home?
A

Yes, uh-huh (affirmative).

My mother and I had

talked about it, so I explained to him my mother had a home
and we had the need of taking care of her now and what were
we to do?
Q

And what was the object there 9

So that you could

assist your mother —
A

Sell the home, yes.

Q

If the intent then was to sell the home, why did

your mother convey her third interest to Carolyn?
A

At the advice of Larry Moore, that to protect that

third interest she could deed that to another one of her
children or someone else and salvage that third-

It appeared

that the others were not going to participate so it was his
advice.
Q

Okay, sell (inaudible)9

A

Hopefully that we could have sold that one third

and they would have bought it out, that they would have
bought that third from their mother.
Q

Okay.

If the object was to use the home for Ada's

support, why didn't she receive any consideration for the
conveyance to Carolyn 9

A

That's what I was told.

Q

Do you know when he was divorced?

A

I don't recall.

Q

Do you know when he was married?

A

I don't.

Q

Do you know if he was even married at this time?

A

No I don't.
MR. SWENSEN: Thank you, Mr. Irvine, that's all.
THE COURT:

Redirect?

MR. CARTWRIGHT:

Just one issue.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. CARTWRIGHT:
Q

In regards to when the property was quit claimed

from Ada to her daughter Carolyn, was Carolyn buying that
property?
A

No, she was not buying it.

Q

Why did it go to her?

A

In hopes that we would be able to sell that portion

of the home to acquire funds for my mother's care.
MR. CARTWRIGHT: That's all.
THE COURT:
MR. SWENSEN:
on that same matter.
///
///

Thank you.

Anything further Mr. Swensen?
Yes Your Honor, just a clarification
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5255
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT IRVINE,
Plaintiff,
VS.

)
)
;
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 030920001

j

SHARON CRAIG ANDERSON and
COLLEEN CRAIG ERICKSON,

i
]
]

Judge Hanson

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court, the Honorable Timothy R.
Hanson, sitting without a jury on September 28 and 29th, 2004. The plaintiff, Robert D.
Irvine, was represented by John Burton Anderson and Joe Cartwright. The defendants,
Sharon Craig Anderson and Colleen Craig Erickson were represented by James G.
Swensen, Jr. The Court heard the testimony of a number of witnesses, received and
reviewed numerous written exhibits, and evaluated the arguments of counsel. The Court
announced its decision on this case on October 14, 2004. Being fully advised and

pursuant to Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and based upon such testimony
and evidence, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

There were two main issues presented at trial by the parties to the Court.

First, what interest, if any, did Ada R. Craig ("Craig") have in the real property after
executing the January 19, 1981 deed; and second, if Craig owned a joint tenancy interest
in the real property following the execution of the January 19, 1981 deed, was she
competent to transfer her interest in the property to her other daughter, Carolyn Abbott.
2.

Based upon the strict application of the words of the deed, the Court finds

that Ada R. Craig conveyed to herself and to her daughters Sharon Craig Anderson and
Colleen Craig Erickson the property in joint tenancy, with fxill rights of survivorship, and
in addition to her one-third joint tenancy interest, Craig also granted to herself a life
estate in the real property.
3.

The Court also finds that Ada Craig intended to grant under herself and to

her daughters a joint tenancy interest in the property, and addition to her one-third joint
tenancy interest, Craig also intended to grant to herself a life estate in the real property.
4.

There was not any believable or persuasive evidence that Ada Craig

intended to abandon control of the day to day operations or control of the property while
Ada was alive. The evidence suggests that she intended to retain control over the
property.
5.

Following the execution of the 1981 deed, Ada Craig, Sharon Anderson

and Colleen Erickson shared a one-third interest in the totality of the property as joint
tenants, with rights of survivorship.

6.

Ada Craig retained a joint tenancy interest so that if one or both of her

daughters predeceased her, a share or all of the property would return to Craig, and not go
to another family member of the co-owner daughters. She was interested in giving the
property to her daughters if she died, but was not interested in giving the property to one
of her daughters' heirs if a daughter predeceased her. She therefore intended to retain a
joint tenancy interest in the property.
7.

The life estate Craig retained in addition to her joint tenancy interest was

also retained for another important purpose: By creating a life estate only for herself, Ada
intended to retain day-to-day control of the property. The "reserving a life estate only"
language in the 1981 deed was intended to reserve the life estate only in the name of Ada,
and not in the name of her daughters, which excludes her two daughters from control of
the property while Ada Craig was alive.
8.

The evidence shows that Ada Craig said she owned the property following

the 1981 deed, and also that Colleen Erickson testified that this was a l/3 rd , l/3 rd , l/3 rd
ownership relationship between Ada, Colleen Erickson, and Sharon Anderson. Other
witnesses who testified for plaintiff supported this interpretation of Ada Craig's
ownership intent.
9.

Whether one looks to Ada's intent, or looking at the actual language of the

1981 deed, the result is the same, as specified above.
10.

The Court finds that to the extent a joint tenancy interest and a life estate

interest might somehow be inconsistent, which the Court does not believe they are, the
joint tenancy estate is the greater estate than the life estate in this circumstance, and the
life estate would therefore merge into the joint tenancy estate.

11.

Defendants have the burden of proving their claim by a preponderance of

the evidence that Ada Craig was not competent to execute the Quit Claim Deed from Ada
Craig to Carolyn Abbot on January 21, 1999 or the Last Will and Testament of Ada Craig
dated February 10, 1999.
12.

The evidence does not support defendants' claims that Ada Craig was not

competent in the signing of the 1999 documents. This evidence is presented by credible,
independent, third-party witnesses, who did not demonstrate any bias or pecuniary
interest. Such witnesses have shown that when the 1999 documents were signed, Ada
Craig was mentally competent. She was active in the health care center activities, was
able communicated her needs and desires, was mentally sharp, and did not demonstrate
confusion during the periods of time the 1999 documents were signed.
13.

There is compelling evidence that supports the conclusion that Ada Craig

was competent, and no compelling evidence that she was not competent when she signed
the 1999 documents.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes the following
Conclusions of Law:
1.

Ada Craig conveyed to Carolyn Abbott her one-third joint tenancy interest

in the real property located at 251 E, 1700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Carolyn
Abbott subsequently transferred this one-third interest to plaintiff Robert Irvine.
2.

The January 21, 1999 Quit Claim Deed signed by Ada Craig to Carolyn

Abbot and the February 10, 1999 Last Will and Testament are valid, legal instruments
and express the will of Ada Craig to dispose of her property as she intended.

3.

Defendants' claim that the 1999 documents should be set aside based upon

a lack of competency is not supported by the evidence, and such claim is dismissed.
4.

The real property jointly owned by plaintiff and defendants should be

partitioned and be sold.
5.

Plaintiff Robert Irvine should be appointed as Receiver to take reasonable

and proper steps to make sure the property is in a sellable condition, sell the property, and
divide the net sales proceeds between each of the three owners. Whatever reasonable
expenses are necessary to make the property sellable for the benefit of each of the parties
should be deduced from the sales proceeds, and the balance should be divided equally
between Robert Irvine, Sharon Craig Anderson, and Colleen Craig Erickson.
6.

Each party is to bear their own attorney's fees incurred in connection with

this action.
7.

Plaintiff is entitled to Rule 54B costs.

8.

Defendants' counterclaims are dismissed.

9.

There is no evidence supporting an Order for Accounting as requested by

defendants, and such request is therefore denied. However, Robert Irvine shall provide
an accounting as to the sale of the real property and distribution/) f the proceeds.

DATED this

Cf

day ofJ^Sft^2t)04.
BY T7HE COURT:
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Joe Cartwright, #7697
CARTWRIGHT LAW FIRM, P.C.
Wells Fargo Center
299 South Main Street, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5255
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT IRVINE,

MOTION FOR COURT APPROVAL OF
REAL PROPERTY

Plaintiff,
(Expedited Ruling Requested)
vs.

Civil No. 030920001

SHARON CRAIG ANDERSON and
COLLEEN CRAIG ERICKSON,

Judge Hanson

Defendants.

Robert Irvine, as Trustee and Receiver of the real property subject to this action,
respectfully submits this motion for Court approval of the sale of the real property under
the terms specified below.
FACTS
1.

This Court has appointed Robert Irvine as receiver of the property and

directed Mr Irvine to sell the property and divide the proceeds equally between the
parties in this action.

2.

Mr. Irvine obtained an appraisal of the property, and the appraisal showed

an approximate value of $220,000.
3.

Mr. Irvine has worked diligently to market the property, and received an

offer to buy the property. After offers and counteroffers, the agreed upon purchase price
of the property will be Two Hundred Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($212,500.00). A copy of the Real Estate Purchase Contract reflecting this agreement is
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
4.

Based upon the appraisal, the condition of the property, and the general

market in Salt Lake City, Mr. Irvine believes that the pending offer is a good and fair
price for the sale of the real property.
Based upon these facts, Mr. Irvine requests that the Court approve the pending
sale of the property as reflected in the attached Real Estate Purchase Contract.
REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RULING
Because time is of the essence on this pending sale, Mr. Irvine requests an
expedited ruling to approve the sale.
Dated this 4th day of February, 2005.
CARTWRIGHT LAW FIRM, P.C.

Jo6 Cartwright,
Cartwright Attorney for
Robert Irvine

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 4th day of February, 2005,1 served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document upon the person(s) named below by placing such
document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
James G. Swensen, Jr.
Swensen & Andersen, PLLC
136 South Main St., Suite 318
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
And also by faxing a copy of this motion to Mr. Swensen at (801) 36^510.
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EARNEST MONEY RECE!?T

Buyer Jun* SkolMnysbnrq offers to punches* the Property dsrcr'bed tote* «mf hereby delivers to the Brokerage*, a*
Earnest Money, the amount of $2flQQtothe form of p e r ^ l l ? * p h , ^ which, upon Acceptance of this offer by ett partios
(as defined In Section 23), shall be deposited in accordance with slate law.

Racaivedby:

* ? { s y > ^

W%n

on

\.2&.tf?

(0»f»1

«*A0«|t*6Q«f 'fOftrf Of fclfllttt Monty)

Brokerage: lewis, Wfltttffi. ft PomfaUgftfBfa^

Phone N^moer £ 3 1 - 4 6 7 - 2 1 0 0

OFFER TO PURCHASE
1. PROPERTY: 2 5 1 E 1 7 0 0 South also described as: T a x I D # 1 6 . 1 8 . 1 B 1 . 0 1 3 City of Salt lafrft City County of
SflBJLate Stale of Utah, ZIP
fiilJJ5{m*-Property').
1,1 Included Kerne. Unless excluded herein, this tale include* the following Kemt if presently owned end attached to
the Property: plumbing, healing, air conditioning futures and equipment; ceiling tans; water heater: built-in appliances;
light fixtures and bulbs; tiathroom flxturee; curtain*, draperies and rods; window end door screens; storm doors and
window*: window blinds; awnings; installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system; permanently affixed carpets;
automatic garage door oponsr and accompanying tr»ntmittcr(s); fencing; »ndi trees and shrubs. The following items shall
also be Included In thle sale end conveyed under separate Bill of Ssle with warranties as to title: % j ; q n g e s . /f

refffqeratgre, Ztftshwaslrer- ?l* items ag s$en in property on 1,23.05
1«£ Excluded kerne. The following Items are exuutjeC from fob *t*e: N/A
1 4 Water Rights. Thefallowingwater rights are induded In this sale: all appurtenapl; rights to the property
2. PURCHASE PRICE The purchase price for the Property is $2Qj5CQQ
2.1 Method of Payment. Tha purchase price win be poW as follows:
?2Q0Q (*) Esrneet Money Oepeslt. Vnder certain conditions described in this Contract, THIS
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME iOTALLY HON-REHJN0ABL&
x-K) &1Q4pQQ CM New Lean. Buyer agrees to a ppty for a new loan es provided In Section 2.3. Buyer will apply foe

v \uA

crtF™ * ^ ^ * "*
r*^\

S
$
Jb 6^1 0 ( X W f t 5 9 f l
^
*
52QSSGQ

ta,tew

N **»•• TO CONVENTIONAL I J FHA { J VA
] OTHER (specify)
If en FHA/VA loan applies, see attached FHA/VA Loan Addendum.
If the loan Is to Include any particularterms,then check below end give details:
[ J SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS
!

(c) Loan Assumption Addendum (see attached Assumption Addendum, if applicable)
(d) Seller Financing (sea attached Seller Financing Addendum. If applicable)
(e) Other (specify).
(0 Balance of Purchase Price tn Cash at Settlement
PURCHASE PRICE. Total ^fM7??{*)^rri^(fJ

72 Financing Condition, (check applicable boa)
(a) [ X ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the applicable loan(s)
referenced In Section 2.1(b) or (c)(the loon"). This condition Is referred to astf*e"Financing Condition."

(b) I ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a loan. Section 2.3
does not apply.
2.3 Application for Loan.
(e) Buyer"! duties. No later than the loan Application & Fee Deadline referenced in Section 24(a), Buyer shall apply
for the Loan, "loan Application" occurs only when Buyer has: <l) completed, signed, and delivered to the lender (the
"Lender*) the initial loon application end documentation required by the Lender, and (H) paid all loan application fee* at
required by the Lander. Buyer agrees to diligently work to obtain the Loan. Buyer will promptly provide trie Lender with
any additional documentation as required by the Lender.
(b) Procedure If Loan Application Is denied, if Buyer receives written notice (rem the Lender that the Lender does
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Deposit shell bo returned to Buyer: (II) If the Notice of Loan Denial was received by Buyer after that date, the Earnest
Money Deposit shall be released to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept ae Seller's e*cJush/o remedy the Earnest Money
Deposit as liquidated damages, A failure to cancel as provided in this Section 2.3(b) shall have no effect on the Financing
Condition sot forth In Section 2.2(a). Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of eny other section of true Contract shaii be
governed by such other provisions.
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Appraisal Condition applies and the Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Property has appraised far lees
then the Purchase Price (a "Notice of Appraised Value"), Buyer may cancel this Contract by providing a copy of such
written notice to Seller no later than three day* after Buyer's receipt of such written notice. In the event of a canceBatfon
under this Section 2,4: (1) If the Notice of Appraised Value was received by Buyer no later than the Appraisal Deadline
referenced in Section 24(e). the Eameet Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer, (H) e the Notice of Appraised Value
was received by Buyer after that dater the Earnest Money Deposit chafi be released to Seller, and Setter agrees to accept
as Setter's e x c W v e remedy, the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages. A failure to cancel sa provided in this
Section 2.4 shell be 4^ettwi a waiver of the Appraisal Condition by Beyer, Cancellation pursuant to th* provisions of any
other section of this Contract shall be governed by <*:>h other provisions.
3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. Settlement shad talce place on the Settlement Deadline referenced to Section 24(f) t or
on a date upon which Buyer and SeBer agree In writing. "Settlement? shall occur only whan all of the following have been
completed: (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents
required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow Instructions or by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be
paid by Suyer under these documents (exceptor the proceeds of any new Joan) have been delivered by Buyer to Selier
or io the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds; 9T^ (c) 9ny monies required to be paid by Setter
under these documents have been delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the escrow/dosing office in the form of coffected or
cleared funds. Selier and Buyer shall each pay one-half <%) of the fee charged by the escrow/closing office for its
servicee in the eettiemenVctosrng process. Taxes and asseeements for the current year, rents, and interest on assumed
obligations shall be prorated at Settlement as set forth in this Section. Tenant deposits (Including, but not limited to.
security deposits, cleaning depoelts and prepaid rents) shall be paid or credited by Setter to Buyer at Settlement.
Prorations set forth In this Section shall be made as of the Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(f), unless
otherwise agreed to hi writing by the parties. Such ^ . i ^ g £&&$ lnc/„oe the settlement statement. The transaction will be
considered closed when Settlement has been completed, and when all of the following have been completed: (I) the
proceeds of My new loan have been delivered by the Lender to Seller or to the escrow/dosing office; and (<(} the
applicable Closing documents have been recorded In the office of th« county recorder. The actions described In parts (i)
and (J!) of the preceding sentence shall be completed within four calendar days of Settlement
4. POSSESSION, Seller shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within: [ J

hours [ J

days after

closing; JXJ Other (specify) R E C O R D I N G
5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract:
( / ^ Seller's Mtlale 1 ^ ] Bayer's Initials
The Listing Agent. Sandrq dnflftn / Launie Belnap. represents [X] Seller ( J Buyer ( | both Buyer end Seller
aa a Limited Agent;
Tne Listing Broker, JflygQn C pritchfleld. represents [XJ Seller ( I Buyer [ J both Buyer and Seller
ae a Limited Agent;
The Selling Agent JavmiSQn L Petersen, represents { JSetl.r [X] Buyer ( J both Buyer and Seller
aa a Limited Agent;
The SHIing Broker. Lifirja VVQlcott. represents t I Seller (X] Buyer ( ] both Buyer end Seller
aa a Limited Agent;
S. TITLE INSURANCE. At Settlement, Seller agrees to pay for a standard-coveraye owner's pottey o' title insurance
insuring Buyer In the amount of the Purchase Price. Any additional title Insurance coverage shell be at Buyer*© BKpen^
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than toe Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b}. Seller shall provide
to Buyer the following documents which are coltectlvely referred to as the 'Setter Disclosures":
(a) a Seller property condition disclosure for the P opriy. signed ac«J dated by Setter;
(b) a commitment for the policy of trtle,jniurance:
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M I tfrfttsn notice of a ™ * i m * 5idfar"oonitibrts known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or
zontna code violations: and
(•)'oth*r (eoeciry) Hoc-iimantatlon of Zoning from SfiR 1 flKO GUY
* , BUYER'S ??K?HT F ? CANCEL B A S E * DM EVALUATIONS AWD INSPECTIONS. *uy*<*

obligation to purchase

under this Contract (check applicable boxes):
(m) HO IS r t tS NOT conditioned upon Buyer** approval of the content of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in

Section 7;
f b) f X ] IS f 1 IS HOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical condition inspection of the Property;
(cl f I I S DC] IS NOT condRlonsd upon Buyer's approval of a survey of the Property by a licensed surveyor ("Survey);
(eft [ X ] IS t 1W NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approve of the cost terms and avatfabflty of homeowner's insurance
coverage \or the Property;
W

W

W I 1 * NOT conditioned upon Buyer** approval of the following teats ami evaluations or the property;

(aped*}

Pest Inspection & any oth,y tests requesiSQ DY trie OfaressipnftM romp infractor
ff any of the above <tem$ are cnecKftd m tne affirmative, inen Sections 6 . i . 62,5.3 and 5.4 appiy, u**jmi$«, ISmf wO not
appiy. The iiema checked fan Ihe a r w n i w y ibirm » » vC*ro£%i*wy ivmfivu *v «» »*e uVSiv«uiOna «»wmptrvwCna. v^*>*~c
Indiyh&sit or entitles cf Buyer's choice. Seller egree* to cooper*** with t h * Evaluations & inspections and with the
w*iHc«-thraugh inspection utd*f Section 11.
6.1 Evaluations & Inspections Deadline. No later than the Evaluation* St Inspection! Deadline referenced In Section
24(c) Buyer Khali: (a) complete all Evaluations & inspections; and (b) determine it the Evaluations & Inspections are
acceptable to Buyer.
5.2 Kigm io Cancel or d e j e c t « 3uy«r determine* that the £vs&?ticns & Inspections srs unacceptable, Suycr may.
no SaSer than tfcs gvafcations £tnspacfisna Deadline, cither {a} csnee! thfe Centred by pravkSng written notice to Seller.
whereupon the Earnest Jersey Deposit aheJJ t?s released to Buyer; or (b) provide SeHer with written notice of obfoction*.
9.3 Failure to ReepgttdL if by the expiration of the Evatuetions & Inspections Deadline, Buyer does not (a) cancel this
Contract as provided in Section 3.2: or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding tha Evaluations & Inspections, the
Evaluations & Inspections shell be deemed approved by Buyer.
6.4 Response by Seder. If Buyer provides written objections to Seller. Buyer and Seller cha» have seven calendar
days after Salter* receipt of 8uyer*3 enactions (the "ftecponea Period") in which to agree in writing v s w thy msaxzr sf
resoMnp Buyer's objectJonj. Except as prodded in Section 192, Selter may, but shall not be reQuired to. resofve Buyers
objections. If Buyer and Seller have not agreed !n writing upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections. Buyer may
cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response
Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be releaced to Buyer. If this Contract Is not canceled by Buyer under
en's Section 8.4, Buymt^s objections shall he ^0emod waived by Buyer. This waiver shall not affect those Items warranted
in Section 10
9. ADDITIONAL TERMS. There [ X ] ARE [ ] ARE NOT 66de^
to this Contract containing additional terms. If there
are, the terms of the foflowing addenda are Incorporated Into this Contract by this reference: ( X ] Addendum No. Qf\Q
I J Seller Flnenclog Addendum ( ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum ( ] Assumption Addendum [XJ Lead-Based Paint
Disclosure & Acknowledgement (In some transactions this disclosure Is required by taw) ( ] Lead-Baaed Paint
Addencfum (in some transaction© this sddondum Is required by law) £ 3 Other (specify):
;

10. SELLER WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS.
10.1 Condition of Title. Seier represents that Sniar has feet title to the Property and wiH convey good and marketable
title to Buyer at Closing by general warranty deed. Buyer agrees, however, to accept title to the Property subject to the
tolfowfng matters of record: easements, deed restrictions, CC&R't (meaning covenants, conditions *nti restrictions), end
rights-of-way, and subject to the contents of the Commitment for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buyer under Section 8.
Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing leases affecting the Property and not expiring prior to Closing.
Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowners association dues, utilities, and other services
provided to the Property after Closing. Except for any loan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 2.1(c). Seller
win cause to be paid off by Cloifng aff mortgages, trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's liens, tax ftens and warrants. Sefier
will cause to be paid current by Closing ait assessments and hom«cwr^ra association &;s».
10.2 Condition of Property. Seller warrants that the Property wtU oe in the following condition OH THE DATE
SELLER DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO 8UYER:
(a) the Property ansll be Droorn-clean ano ire* oi deons *n0 personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant
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nw*ir*w*iated damaoe to the Property shal be reoalred at Seller's expense;
(blFthd heating, cooling. electrical, plumbing and apnnWer systems end fixtures, and the appear*** *uu U I « H £ C * » W «
be In working order end m for Their lntenoea purposes;
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" 1 * > V * Pr^itvT^Trnprovemont*. Including the landscaoln^, will be In the same general condition a* they were on
the date of Acceptance.
_
10.3 Home Warranty Plan. I ne "Home Warranty Pian" referenced in ihis Sect'iun 15.3 & 9«p«?«t6 u««« ths
warranties provided by S e w under 5eciiont> Iw.i *nu iv.£ w0v€u-\\#iiwvii •i»H«rv»i#iv w ^ 5 j i
- *

-*

- . « : . . . . r t sent « SL^S 5*5*5 s U A ? L . r ^ ^ J « « U I M ^ ^ U A

II f*v4ivrfe/< tH» U n m a WflfflWthi

Pisn sr.o« be orcte*-2d by [ J S«ysr [ J Seller find ehsJf be issued by a company seise!** hy r 1 Buyer J 1 Seller. The
cos! c' the Home y/srrsHty Pfen shsl not exceed $ __*____«_«««««__. and shaji be p«W for at Settfement by ( ] Buyer
I ] Seller.
11- WALK-THROUQH INSPECTION, 8efor* Secernent. Buyer m*y, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable time,
conduct a "walk-through" inspection of ihe Property to determine only that the Property is "as represented/ meaning that
the Items referenced In Sections 1.1. B.4 and 10.2 (1he Items') are respectively present, repaired/changed as agreed, and
in the warranted condition, if the Items ere not as represented. Seller will, prior to Settfement, replace, correct or repair the
Items or. with the content of Buyer (and Lender H applicable), escrow an amount at Settiemenx to provide for the same.
The failure to conduct a walk-through inspection, OT to ciaim thai an item is not as represented, shafi not constitute 8
waiver by Buyer of the right to receive, on the data of possession, the (terns as represented.
12. CHANGES OURINO TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closing, none
of the following shall occur without the prior written consent of Buyer: (a) no changes in any existing leasee shall be mace;
(b) no new teases shall be entered Into: (c> no substantial alterations or )mpcovetneats to the Property shall be made or
undertaken: and (d) no further financial encumbrances te the Property shefl be nsids.
13* AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller Is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limitedflabffitycompany, or
other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so end to bind Buyer and
Seller.
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with Its addenda, 8ny attached exhibits, and SeBer Disclosures,
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations,
representation*, warranties, understanding* or contracts between the parties This Contract cennot be changed except by
written agreement of the parties.
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract
(check appftcabte box)

[XJ SHALL
[ ] MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES
first be submitted to mediation. II the parties agree to mediation, the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a
mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to bear Its own costs of mediation, if mediation
falls, the other procedures and rsmed»et available under this Contract shaU apply. Nothing in this Section 15 shall prohfbrt
any parry from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation.
ie* DEFAULT, If Buyer defaults, Seller rn^y elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to
return It and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other retr^dies available at law. If Seller defaults, In
add-on to return of the Earnest Money Deposit. Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue SeHer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies
sveHabte at lew If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages, Salter agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon
demand. It is agreed that denial of a loan Application made by the Buyer Is not a default end is governed by Section
23(b)
17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, attorney tees shall not be awarded for participation
in mediation under Section 15.
1 * . NOTICES. Except as provided In Section 23. all notices required under this Contract must be: (a)towriting; (b) signed
by the party giving notice; and (c) receiveo by the other party or the other party's agent no Jater then the applicable date
referenced In thts Contract.
i e . ABROGATION. Except for the provision* of Sections 10.1. 10-2, 15 and 17 and express warranties made in this
Contract, the provisions of this Contractual! not apply after Closing.
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2© R I S K OP LOSS. All risk of loss to th8 Property, including physical damage or destruction to cne rroptmy ««»»
improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear ano tear wo km* c a u * w Dy « v^iTtg ;n e*7=r^i cc~;;:r:, ~;3:: be
borne Dy Seser cwn me transaction «* ck***ti,
21. TIKE ?-? O * T H i ESSENCE, rimo is of the essence regarding the dates set form MI tn»s Contract Exfonwiro w w v g
agreed to In writing by all parties. Unless otrtsrwtee explicitly stated >n mis Contrari: {«} >*nTv* Ki»"CSJ«iCwr ssch Sc^i^':
oFthis Contract which references a dele snail aosoiuiery be r»quin*S i?y 0-Uv i *?•* s^ourussn ; xr*z S£ i&r ^tr ~ vs*»; r^A
\p) me term "day*"1 shaii mean calendar way* inG Si\»u t ^ co'jr.icc sG^ir.rrir;* c.~ i^ vSy '0??S^: r^ u~? •?•"«*• ^fc— trssgers
shaS rsot D6 3Srium9 vpor< t?t55 oorRpsRte.. termers, sppr^sers end otfe'S **?! p**"** K> this Contract, except as otherwise
ccrs^d tc if*, vydtinc by such non—MftY
22. ?AZ TSASSSaSSiOh? AND COUNTERPART?. Facetaito {^Xj trsnsrfiissfcn c * « signed copy of this Contract, any
addenda and counteroffer end the retransmission of any signed tax shell be the same es delivery of an original This
Contract ard any addenda and counteroffers may be executed In counterparts.
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance* occurs wten Setter <?r Bayer. responding to $n off*' or counteroffer of the other: (a)
signs 3\e offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and ip) communicates to the other party or to the other
pztt/s sgent tnet the o^er or eotjnfctfoffer hastaaartsfanad as required.
24. CONTRACT O&AOLffiE$. Buyer and SeSer 3g,«* that fr* fcSovring de&4ftn*3 she? eppfy to this Contract:
(a) Losn AppSfcs^on $ Fee Deadline
(b) $ f (fer Ddcfeeum QeadMne
(c) EvaHiatlotis & Inspections Deadline
(d) Loan Dental Deadline

Q)mpVf4^ .
ftW^W<^•yyie ysrfffes>
°yr>Y^ w t r t ^

(Dale)
(una)

(e) Appraise* Deadline

-tVy'g V N ^ ^ ^

P*»)

(S) Settlement Deadline

*mr w&z

pete)

*»^ »»»—»- * •

25. OFFER ANO TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purches* the Property on o » above terms and conotttons. if
S««t»r doos not accept thte oH*r by. ffi'.fju
\ ] AM [XJ PM Mountain Tlm« o ^ ' ™ " *
this offer shall lapse; end the Brokerage shall return the Eamast Money Deposit *.o &u

c?^ Q-Jjz*u*Jp<*J:
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(Offer Osta)

The later of the above Offer Dates shall oe refernsd 10 as the r Off«r Rwfcrenc# Date"

(Buyers' Names) {PLEASE PRINT)
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J J ACCEPTANCE OF Q F F I * TO PMRCMASE: Seller Accepts theforegoingoffer on the term* and condition* specified
ebovo^
{i^wCUNTE^CFf": ScSsrprsssnis fef Bvytft Accsptsne* £** t£?W €* B**y**** off** aubjact to the exceptions or
rftSXftfe&gn* at^ujeptfiftg in the attached ADDENDUM NO. ^^J&j^gU*-

/-h>~#y
(S*l«rtc 81s<i*!uf*}

{Data}

(Setters* Names} (PLEASE PRINT)

7/M £**.
(Time)

(Setter's Signature)

(Notice Address)

(Dale)

(2p Code)

(Time)

(Pnona)

C ] K£JgCTlOalr $*Bar reject* theforegoingoffer.

(SaitefliStanatufel

(Date)

(Time)

(Seflec's Signature)

(Oate)

(Tima)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT

State taw require* Broker to furnish Buyer and $tH*r with copies of this Contract beertog al etgnecuros. IHH tn applicable
socbon beiow.)
A . I £ f ± £ £ * ? ! ± e k * * * » * * » * » n f m final ^yrj^ * f t h *

(Suysf'a Signature}

foiwi<*f*1

(D219)
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f!r#nTr<lct hoarffUl * f l l<ffirwtljrP3t'

(Buys*'* S/ytaluf*)

(O*'*.'

(Salter's Signature)

(Oate J

hvt-irz

(Seder's Signature)

(Oate)

6. i personally caused e fmai copy 01 ine foregoing Conifad beat'rig aii signatufvi w t v [ J *****
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BUYER ANO SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLiKES REFERENCED Wi SECTiCft 24 O f T ^ REPC
{CHECK APPL&ASLE SOX): ^ T REMA.%* fJMCHA£SED [ J ARE CHAttSED AS FCVtOSfS:

To the extent the isrra of tftfc ADDENDUM mod?y or conSc! with any provisions of the REPC. Including efl prfor addenda

provisions of Section
23 cf the REPC. Unless so accepted* the offer as sat forth m this ADDENDUM Shalt lapse,
tfon23cftheREP6

^

f-7^^

(Time)

( ] Buyer I J Se»*r SlgneUire

(Date)

(T>me)

ACCEPTANCecOUNTEROFFEFVREJECTtQM
ChCCKONE:
{ ] ACCEPTANCE; [ 1 Setter { J Buyer hereby accepts the terms of tba ADDENDUM.
t ^CWMTERjbFFER; f J Seller (-^f6uyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO. .yL

/^H^>
(Signatura)

(Date)

*7>0if f. M,
(Time)

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Date)

(Tt^T

t } REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ 1 Buyer rejects the foregor\g ADDENDUM.

(Signatuie)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTOKHCY QZHW*-r
EFFECTIVE AUGUST fl. 2003 IT REPLACES AftO SUPER CEDE 8 ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM.
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ADDENDUM NO. Jmt

H

".

TO

REAL ESTAlfc PURCHASE CONTRACT

THIS 19 AN (XI ADDENDUM ( J COUNTEROFFER 10 Wat REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (lh* -RF^C*) urith
an Offer Refarence Oat* of January ?$. 2Q0S Including ell prior addenda ano counteroffers, between JuQfit
SkotlinyshttrQ *$> Buyer, and
,
a* Selter, regarding the Property located
H | ? S 1 ^ 1 7 Q Q S Salt Lafry pity. Salt Lakp County. UT B ^
part of the REPC:

InPtrongre nrlcg.ttt.tee t?1? Sffl
BUYER AND 3ELLER AOREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC
(CHECK APPLICABLE OOX»: fXJ REGAIN UNCHANGED I 1 ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS:

0d
'_

Totoeextant theterm*of thts ADDENDUM modify or conflict with an> provtsiottK of the REPC including oft prior addenda
and counteroffer*, thesetermsshall control. Alt pther term* of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers,
not modified by mi* ADDENDUM shea remain the same [X] Setter [ J Buyer shad have until 8:00 f J AM (XJ f*M
Mountain Tim© on January 26 2005 (Date), 4 mxnpt the term* ot ite* ADDENDUM k\ aocordanc* wih tr.e provision
cf Suction £3 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set foftri in thi* ADDENDUM «hai« lapso.
l)4<gyy«r{ J Seller Signature O
l)4\gyy«r{

^{Date).
Pate), (Time)

( JBu
JBuy«r{ ) seller Signature

pate)

{Timo)

ACCEPTANCE/CCKWTEROFFER/REJECTION
CHECK ONE:
y
M ACCfiPTAfilCE: MfSe&er £ J Buyer herotiy accepts the ternis of this ADDENDUM
r

tStgnolufo)

FER; I J S«H«r { I Buyer preWnfc* a* a coumorotTO" the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO
{Date)

(Tune)

(Signature)

(Date)

(Timei

(Date)

(Time)

{ ] REJECTION: ( ] Sailer [ I Buyer rcjeste tho fmegoing ADDENDUM.

(Signature)

(Dato)

(Time)

(SlgnaUirw)

THIS FORM APWOVBO OX THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AMD TMG OFRCE OF THS UTAH ATTORNEY C6N6RAL.
BFF6CTIVE AUGUST 5, 2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPER9EPES ALL PREVlOOSLr APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM.

Complaint
dated September 3,2003
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